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ABSTRACT

Throughout the process of writing this thesis, I have struggled with whether or not
to use the term “gender abolition.” In one sense, the term itself initially piqued my
interest in the topic. I remember the first time I heard of gender abolition, I had an
immediate intuitive resistance. I thought it was another manifestation of the disconnect
that exists between academia and society at large. However, my feelings quickly changed
when the concept was explained to me in my sophomore year philosophy seminar. My
incredulousness transformed to excitement when I realized gender abolition was actually
simply the full realization of gender equality. I loved how provacative the term was, and
my friends skeptical reactions when I would bring the topic up in conversation. Gender
abolition was also an intellectual challenge, as I had minimal exposure to gender theory
prior to college. Everything I was learning was new and made me confront issues I had
never questioned before.
Yet, as I began to get further along in my writing process, I again began to
question the effectiveness of the term. I worried that abolition was too trendy of a term. It
reminded me of the echo chamber of social media, particularly at a liberal arts school in
California. I thought back to my initial feelings and conversations I had with others and
started to fear that the term could distract from my argument. I worried people would
either write off the topic immediately, or uncritically embrace it. As someone who loves
argumentation, I did not know which was worse, and upon reflection I realized I could
not fault people for either of these positions. Abolition is a powerful word intimately
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connected with the struggle against slavery. Who wouldn’t want to be an abolitionist? At
the same time, the term has deep legal connotations, so I understand why someone’s
initial thought could be: and now they want to make being a man/woman illegal?!
Despite these reservations, I decided to embrace the term. I think there is a very
profound duality and tension at the heart of gender abolition. In one way, it forcefully
articulates the worthy and (seemingly) uncontroversial idea that men and women should
be treated as equals. At the same time, the scope of abolition makes clear how deeply
gender based injustice runs, and how hesitant we all are to truly accept what is morally
required of us. Perhaps even more so than race, the inequalities between the genders is
assumed to be a natural consequence of biology.
Overall, my thesis aims to demonstrate that the full realization of human
advancement as understood from a Marxist perspective, as well as within the framework
of Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom requires the abolition of gender. I argue that
as long as gender endures, neither Sen nor Marx’s vision for the development of
humanity has been achieved. I begin by offering my own operative definition for gender.
This definition is not a normative definition laying out how I believe gender should
function, but rather how gender does function within our patriarchal world. Chapter two
focuses on the meaning of gender abolition. I question the legitimacy of the way we
currently conceptualize biological sex, which I argue erases the existence of intersex
people. I also consider the position of transgender people within my framework, and their
relationship with gender abolition. The second section of this chapter draws heavily upon,
and offers abolitionist readings of Cheryl Harris’s Whiteness as Property Angela Davis’s
Women and Capitalism.
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Having defined these two key concepts, I transition to my analysis of Marx and
Sen’s theories. Looking first at Marx I argue that despite the fact that he never discusses
the concept of gender explicitly, his call for the abolition of the division of labor found in
The German Ideology is effectively an argument in support of the complete dismantling
of gender. I also argue that the ideal of human emancipation articulated in On the Jewish
Question necessitates gender abolition. I then shift to Sen’s Development as Freedom,
which defines development as the removal of forms unfreedoms, one of which, I argue, is
gender. I chose to focus on Marx and Sen because I think there is a significant
juxtaposition between the two philosophers’ overall beliefs. Most obviously, Marx held
that capitalism was the source of great degradation for the human race, while Sen
believes capitalism has the ability to promote freedom. I believe this strengthens my
argument because whether or not the reader has faith in capitalism, it is clear that gender
must be abolished to maximally advance the human condition.
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CHAPTER 1: My operative definition of Gender
In furthering my argument for gender abolition, I will define gender as the
societally and institutionally enforced construct that delegates duties, privileges, and
expectations based on biological sex assigned at birth. The “morally arbitrary”
characteristic of biological sex ascribes onto every individual a binary conception of what
constitutes a proper life. Gender is taught and entrenched as children grow up, as failure
to conform behaviors with gender-based expectations can have dramatic social, economic
and legal ramifications. Fundamentally, gender offers to men much greater freedom in
actualizing, defining, and pursuing their desires, while perpetuating women’s servility.
Moreover, gender is also a major force in shaping the way we come to understand what
we believe that we desire. Critically, the burdens associated with gender are not felt
equally by all women and compound with other forms of vulnerability (race, class
positions, disability) to create unique challenges.
Here, it is important to point out that this is not intended to be a normative
definition of gender. This is not what I believe gender should be, but what I believe
gender is at present. My definition is not what I believe that gender can be in its best form
- a recognition and identification with our internal and external selves. I intend for this
definition to reflect the historical and cultural realities that find their root in the restrictive
gender binary, not to replicate these unjust forces. If this definition seems uninclusive of
transgender people, that is a reflection of the historical fact that gender in its traditional
construction has not been inclusive of transgender people. It may seem counterintuitive
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but in fact, the courage of transgender individuals to live life as their truest selves is one
of the most revolutionary forces (through the erosion of the linkage between biological
sex and gender presentation) furthering gender abolition.
As I see it, there are two main components of gender abolition - two different
avenues through which we can dismantle the most restrictive elements of gender. By
gender abolition, it is not meant that presenting in a particular way will be met with some
type of sanctions because it is now against the law. Instead, abolition in this context
refers to change that fundamentally alters the way in which gender functions. This can
occur either through eroding the linkage between biological sex assigned at birth and
gender, or by changing the relationships of dominance and subservience that charecterize
the traditional gender binary. This will be explored in greater detail in chapter two.

“DELEGATION”

Turning now to my definition of gender, I first want to focus on the delegation of
“duties, privileges, and expectations.” I do not aim to give a complete account of all the
duties, privileges and expectations that come along with gender as presently constructed.
Instead, I will highlight some of the aspects that have the most impact on individuals
ability to achieve the life that they desire, while simultaneously respecting and affirming
their human dignity. These three concepts, duties, privileges, and expectations, are all
intimately connected. For example, the burden of women’s “duties” serve to perpetuate
male “privilege.” This is seen in Karl Marx’s observation that, as with the division of
labor generally, men are better able to attain material wealth by “disposing of the labor
9

power” of women within the household (German Ideology 159). In other words, the duty
of domestic labor shouldered by women privileges men economically. Moreover, gender
based assumption of “duty” and “privilege” both inextricably linked to the “expectations”
of both parties. I choose to separate these terms not to suggest that they are different, but
instead because each plays a specific role in my definition. Additionally, the phrase
“delegates expectations, duties, rights, and privileges” aims to situate my definition in the
context of the discourse of distributive justice.
Focusing first on duty, one of the main areas of consensus across feminist thought
is the recognition that gender places a disproportionate share of unpaid domestic labor on
the shoulders of women to the benefit of the male breadwinner. This is one of the
foundational assumptions of the traditionally gendered family. Plainly, gender delegates
far greater domestic duties to women than to men. Susan Moller Okin, one of the greatest
modern feminist thinkers, opens her book Justice, Gender and the Family, by attributing
inequality between men and women to this particular aspect of gender. Moller Okin
states, “Underlying and intertwined with [the inequalities between men and women] is
the unequal distribution of the unpaid labor of the family (Okin 4).” This perspective is
not limited to modern feminist thinkers. In The German Ideology, Karl Marx also
contends that the division of labor found within the family is the basis for the division of
labor more broadly, which he views as the root of all inequality (German Ideology 158,
197). This will be explored in much greater depth in chapter 3.
Critically, the justice of this unequal distribution of domestic duty has long been
left unchallenged, even among esteemed contemporary philosophers like John Rawls.
Okin argues that Rawls fails to sufficiently address how gender fits in his theory of
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justice put forward in his seminal work A Theory of Justice. As Moller Okin points out,
Rawls “specifically mentions the family as a just institution - not, however, to consider
whether the family “in some form” is a just institution but to assume it (Okin 94).” This
issue is compounded by the fact that the subjects of Rawls’ hypothetical “original
position” are all “head of families (Okin 94).” Based on this critical omission, Okin holds
that even if those in the original position adopted Rawls’ two principles, they would fail
in creating entirely just institutions as the family is a major institution itself - one that
Rawls regards as foundational to developing a sense of justice in all citizens (Okin 9597).
Turning now to the delegation of privilege, it is important to recognize that
definitionally, the term implies that some occupy a relatively superior position as
compared to others. Thinking of gender in this way is useful for a couple of reasons.
Firstly, conceiving of privilege as something that is distributed on the basis of gender
makes explicit the power differential that exists between men and women in patriarchal
society. Gender as I define it implies a power differential between men and women. If
this does not exist, then gender no longer exists in its current form. For example, men
generally hold more economic and political power than women. This power differential is
largely based on the social roles that men occupy as a result of their privileged position
within the traditionally gendered family. If this power differential ceased to exist, it
would require that gender no longer assigned social roles that leave women with
relatively weaker agency as compared to men. More concretely, this means that if we
were to eliminate gender privilege, we would likely have to deconstruct the delegated
social roles that define gender itself.

11

At the same time, this way of conceptualizing gender also makes clear the
injustice that necessarily exists within gender. No one can question that men and women
are equally deserving of dignity by virtue of our shared humanity. Yet, the idea of
privilege distributed based on gender is inherently opposed to the notion of human
dignity. All non consensual relationships of dominance and servility are inherently
degrading, and this is exactly what gender is. First of all, gender is unconsensual in the
sense that no one other than transgender people explicitly chooses their gender. Instead,
gender is assigned at birth based on biological sex. If we understand consent as the act of
“giv[ing] assent or approval,” it is clear that a newborn cannot possibly consent to
gender, and therefore their delegated position of dominance or servility (Merriam
Webster). Moreover, if gender ceased to be degrading, then what would be left could no
longer be properly referred to as gender so long as we maintain our current understanding
(the rationale for this claim mirrors the logic put forward in the previous paragraph).
Fundamentally, gender implies coercive hierarchy.
This observation is supported by Adrienne Martin in her unpublished paper,
Against Mother’s Day and Employee Appreciation Day and Other Representations of
Oppressive Expectations as Opportunities for Excellence and Beneficence. It is important
to note that although not all women are mothers, the dominant, patriarchal construction of
gender is largely built upon the traditionally gendered family. Many of the values that our
society has imposed on mothers are also imposed on women generally without
distinction. For example, one of the primary assumptions of motherhood is presence of
certain domestic skills such as cooking, cleaning, and ability to handle childcare (Martin
4). Yet, these are many of the same qualities that society generally attributes to all
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women. This is evident in women’s occupational over representation in the caregiving
industry which includes childcare, cleaning, and nursing (Erik Olin Wright). For this
reason, the implicit assumptions connected to motherhood applies to women that are not
mothers themselves. Consequently, observations regarding motherhood provide critical
insights into gender generally.
Returning to Martin’s paper, one of her foundational assertions is the idea that
motherhood within the traditionally gendered family places “oppressive expectations” on
mothers (Martin 5). Most forcefully, as I have mentioned, an expectation of domesticity
defines what is normatively required of mothers within the traditionally gendered family
(Martin 4). Implicit in domesticity is the willingness to sacrifice your own self interest for
the good of others. Martin points this out stating, “when push comes to shove, you will
put your child’s interests before anyone else’s, including your own (Martin 4).” Martin
supports this point by examining mothers day advertisements that by and large “depic[t]
an onslaught of domestic labor, demanding and needy kids, helpless male partners, and
exhausted moms (Martin 4).” It is with this background that Martin rightfully asserts that
the traditional idea of mothers as“self-sacrificing care-givers, nurturers, and homemakers
(Martin 4).”
Given that motherhood’s historical and contemporary construction mandates that
mothers must sacrifice their own interests in order to fulfill their duty to the family,
“mother” is a position of servitude within the hierarchy that characterizes that
traditionally gendered family. Critically, this hierarchy places men in a dominant position
(delegation of privilege along the basis of gender), while promoting women;s
subservience. As I have stated, the assumptions of motherhood also apply to women
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generally. Women are frequently evaluated on these same qualities even if they are not
mothers. If we understand the assumptions of the traditionally gendered family as the
foundation for the construction of gender, then it is clear that the dynamics that exist
within the family apply to all women (Okin 101). Therefore, the delegation of privilege
that exists within the family corresponds to the patriarchal hierarchy that all of us exist
within regardless of whether we have children. Flatly, the delegation of privileges that I
point out in my definition is a recognition of the definite hierarchy found in the concept
of gender. As presently constructed, gender is antithetical to the idea of equality between
men and women.
Transitioning, in speaking of expectations, I must first point out that gender is an
inherently social phenomena. It is an unending process that we all, at least passively,
participate in. Unlike biological sex, which has a scientific basis (xx vs xy
chromosomes), gender is constructed within collectives. There is no reason why gender
must take the form that it does currently, other than the historical fact that we have given
the concept a specific meaning collectively over time. Gender very well could have taken
a different form. With this in mind, it is clear that gender cannot be separated from its
expectations, as expectations are simply a manifestation of the fact that gender exists only
through human sociality and judgements.
I should also differentiate between two types of expectations. There are the
expectations that we have of others, and the expectations that we have regarding our own
worth and what we deserve. These are two closely related concepts, with expectations of
self frequently enforcing gender, and expectations of others underwriting distributive
injustices. Understanding that expectations characterize gender is critical to both
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understanding gender enforcement, as well as gender from the perspective of distributive
justice. I will focus on enforcement shortly, but first I want to think about expectations as
being “delegated.”
What relevance do gendered expectations have to distributive justice? Gender
imposes on every human a normative conception of what constitutes a proper life. Put
simply, gender tells everyone what their place in the world is and how they should live.
This does not only include the actions that we should take, but also what responses our
actions rightfully merit from others. Put another way, this means that gender shapes how
we perceive what we deserve. In the context of distributive justice, this is important
because it speaks to why different distributive disparities exist between men and women,
and how they go unnoticed and unchallenged. The delegation of a sepcific expectations
based on biological sex translates directly into material differences. In this way, gender
based delegation of expectations facilitates the unjust distribution of social goods in a
way that is to the benefit of men only.
Concretely, this translates to wealth given women’s overrepresentation within
“caregiving” professions that are typically undervalued, and more vulnerable place within
the workforce. This works on many levels. To give a few examples, as I mentioned in the
section on privilege, one effect of gender is occupational segregation that is characterized
in part by women occupying a disproportionately large share of caregiving jobs (Olin
Wright). Here, expectations function within the individual by shaping people's ideas of
what they should aspire to, based on the characteristics they are normatively expected to
possess and develop according to gender. These careers are then consequently devalued
because of the way that patriarchy places greater importance on typically male
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professions (Olin Wright). In this case, expectations function by shaping individuals
ideas of what they deserve. Men, who have historically had control of how the world is
ordered, feel their occupations are more important. Simultaneously, women are
conditioned to expect that their work is less valuable and that they deserve less.
Another reason for why women’s economic position is weaker than men’s on
aggregate is the domestic burdens shouldered by women. This unjust burden makes it
more difficult for women to participate in the workforce in a way that largely does not
apply to men. Women may not choose to enter the workforce at all, particularly
considering the fact that the traditionally gendered family implies a father in the formal
labor market, while the mother handles the enormous amount of unpaid labor that exists
within the household. Moreover, workplaces have historically been ordered around this
assumption, as evidenced by office hours and parental leave policies, that allow workers
little ability to handle domestic labor as well as wage labor (Okin 4). Additionally,
women may choose to leave the labor force because of these very same burdens. In these
cases, expectations determine what each member of the family's role should be. This is
enforced by expectations that are imposed by others, but here I am only focusing on
expectations of ourselves. Clearly, the implicit expectations present in gender hold great
weight in determining the distribution of economic power between men and women.
Beyond economic power, expectations also impact self respect and our ability to
prioritize our own desires. In Feminist Contractarianism, Jean Hampton cites a study by
Carol Gilligan that concluded that gender creates distinct “interests,” in the same way as
the division of labor. Hampton uses the example of two children, Jack and Amy, to
illuminate the way in which society creates distinct ways of thinking for men and women
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from the time that they are children (Hampton 231). Jack’s response to the question of
balancing “responsibility to oneself and responsibility to others'' prioritizes self-interest
(Hampton 228). On the other hand, Amy’s response shows much more deference to the
needs of others. However, while this may seem preferable, Amy’s answer fails to place
weight upon her own desires (Hampton 230). Unlike Jack, she is not as confident about
the value of her interests. These two contrasting responses signify two separate, gendered
ways of constructing morality (Hampton 229). Hampton makes clear her support for the
idea that gender influences our self-conceptions of morality stating that the children’s
respective answers serve to justify their future dominance/subservience (Hampton 231).
This is an example of how the delegation of expectations on the basis of gender affects
the distribution of social goods other than money - in this case self respect and agency.

ENFORCEMENT

Shifting, I now want to focus on what I mean when I say that gender as a
construct is socially and institutionally enforced. Socially, one major source of genders
power is found within the family and between peers. What exactly do I mean by
enforced? As stated in my definition, inextricably linked to gender as presently
constructed is the idea that men and women have different normative expectations
governing their behavior and presentation. Put another way, gender is a reflection of the
reality that men and women have imposed upon them different conceptions of how they
should live and behave. These conceptions of what qualifies as a proper life based on
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gender roles are not toothless. As Erik Olin Wright writes in his paper, In Defense of
Genderlessness,
“for gender relations to exist there must be socially recognized norms that
enforce these relations through various kinds of affirmations and sanctions... if
there are no normative pressures to behave in particular ways because of one’s
sex, then gender relations do not exist” (Olin Wright).”
What do these affirmations and sanctions look like in our daily lives? I am sure
that we can all think of instances from our childhood where a young boy was teased for
interest in something that was perceived to be feminine. Similarly, I would assume that
we all witnessed times where young girls were excluded from spaces or activities that
are frequently conceived of as masculine. This is an example of social sanctions that
work to enforce gender roles.
On the other hand, affirmations can be seen in parents encouraging certain
activities over others, or the toys the buy for their children. These are just a few small
examples of how virtually everyone encounters the force of gender throughout their
development. Certainly, experiences and pressures like these can be very formative in
what we come to believe is acceptable for us to desire. Our peers play a major role in
shaping the people we become, from what we value to our self image. However, there are
much more insidious examples of how the social enforcement of unjust gender roles limit
individuals ability to live their most fulfilling life.
Susan Burton is an activist working to provide support to formerly incarcerated
women. Her memoir, Becoming Ms. Burton, offers a lot of important, personal insight
into the unique gender based obstacles poor black women face in pursuit of the best life
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possible. In particular, her discussion of teen motherhood illuminates the oppressive force
of the domestic duties that are central to the unjust construction of womanhood For
example, Susan Burton decided that she wanted to return to school in order to advance
her career opportunities (Burton, 44). However, when she told the class that she had a
baby over the summer, her teacher replied “then why are you here” in front of the entire
class (Burton, 44). The shame Burton felt as a result of this comment pushed her to drop
out (Burton, 44). Burton identifies that this experience is not unique to her stating, “ too
often, black girls like me were considered dropouts but were really “push-outs”—pushed
out of opportunities that school should have provided (Burton 45).”
This excerpt exemplifies two separate levels of gender enforcement
simultaneously, institutional and interpersonal. On an institutional level, it is important to
note that there is no reason that parenthood and pursuing education must be incompatible
in a just society. Nevertheless, the unequal, unpaid domestic labor that characterizes the
traditionally gendered family, is one of the most important factors limiting women’s
agency (Okin 4). One of the most fundamental assumptions of gender/the traditionally
gendered family is that women will take care of children while men work. As Susan
Moler Okin puts it in Justice, Gender and the Family, gendered society is organized in a
way such that “serious and committed members of the workforce (regardless of class) do
not have a primary responsibility or even shared responsibility, for the rearing of children
(Okin 5).” This assumption, which is only one of the many implicit in gender, is evident
of the ordering of virtually all of our institutions, not just the workplace (Okin). With
background, it is evident that free, quality childcare would help take the force out of this
particular aspect of gender. The fact that this is not a social good provided by the state
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speaks is testament to the patriarchy that affords more weight to securing men’s agency
and interest than women’s.
Education is another institution in which we see the very same consequences of
gender left unchallenged. Okin argues that this is evidenced in schools lack of
attentiveness to parents holding in jobs in scheduling matters (Okin 5). I want to make a
slightly different, but related point. As I mentioned, if our government cared about
promoting women’s agency, free childcare would be a great step, and would also
simultaneously erode that aspect of gender. Government’s unwillingness to secure
childcare as a right is one of the most profound ways that gender as currently constructed
is maintained and enforced. In this way, gender takes women’s subservience for granted
and does not seek to promote their unique needs.
Returning to Susan Burton’s experience of high school motherhood, if free childcare was
seen as a right, it is far more likely that she would have been able to finish school.
Although, this is not only for the straightforward reason that it would be a burden off her
shoulder.
Perhaps just as importantly, the normative gendered assumption that she was
failing to fulfill her motherly duties by being at school would most likely be less
powerful. On the interpersonal level, Burton’s teacher's cruel statement exemplifies the
way in which shame is weaponized to enforce the gendered expectation and duty of
motherhood. Her teachers' words would not have had the same biting force if women
were expected, like men, to seek to advance their career prospects, rather than prioritize
their familial duties. But in a world where gender demands and assumes that women take
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on far more than their fair share within the family, Burton’s admirable act of returning to
school despite all the obstacles was met with ridicule.
This perspective is supported by Erik Olin Wright who states, “gender norms
impose real costs on people who violate those norms and this restricts access to the social
means for a flourishing life for people whose gender-linked dispositions do not
correspond to those normative expectations (Olin Wright).” In this case, Burton’s
teacher’s enforcement of sexist expectations of gender created a hostile learning
environment that drove Burton to drop out, which was one of the primary factors that left
Burton vulnerable to prositution and consequently incarceration. The importance of
gender can not be understated in how Burton’s life would develop over the foreseeable
future.
At the same time, it is imperative to point out that, as a poor black woman, Burton
faced gender oppression in a way that was distinct from what a rich, or a white woman
would experience. Burton observed the dynamic between white-teen mothers who
wanted to keep their child rather than giving it up for adoption. Burton recalled that the
nurses tried to talk them out of it arguing that their baby would find a loving home
(Burton, 43). The nurses would also emphasize all the things the mother would miss out
upon by keeping the child such as a social life, college and marriage (Burton, 43).
However, when Burton told the nurse she wanted to keep the kid, she did not receive any
advice. As Susan Burton pessimistically observes, “apparently, in 1966, wonderful
parents and wonderful homes weren’t waiting for little black babies. Nor did I have a
wonderful rest of my life full of opportunities to return to (Burton, 43).” This is an
example of the unique way the burden of motherhood is felt by poor black women given
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the way in which race and class compound with gender. Because of her race and class,
motherhood was pushed upon Susan Burton more strongly than it would have been for a
white woman.
For this reason, my definition would not be complete without the clause that
states, “the burdens associated with gender are not felt equally by all women and
compound with other forms of vulnerability (race, class positions, disability) to create
unique challenges.” This sentence is included to account for the idea of intersectionality
first articulated by Kimberlé Crenshaw in her groundbreaking publication
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. In this work,
Crenshaw focuses on the failings of antidiscrimination law to adequately address the
ways in which black women are uniquely vulnerable given that the “the intersectional
experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism (Crenshaw 1-2).” Crenshaw
argues that the orthodox “single-axis” analysis of discrimination centers the most
priveleged subgroup within the larger body, thereby erasing the experiences of those with
multiple identities through which they experience oppression (Crenshaw 1-2). In other
words, the dominant mode of understanding sexism is based on the experiences of white
women, resulting in black womens unique burdens being left outside of the scope of
discourse on gender. It is from this background that we arrive at the “Crenshaw
imperative,” which asks of us to “focus attention on the predicament of the most
disadvantaged classes of people (Martin 4-5).”
Why is intersectionality important? Without intersectionality, we would have an
incomplete and inaccurate understanding of gender. As exemplified in Burton’s memoir,
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without an intersectional perspective we are unable to understand the unique needs of
black women, or poor women, or undocumented women for example. Not only would we
be at an epistemological disadvantage, but the absence of an intersectional perspective is
responsible for the failures of policies that attempt to remedy gender based burdens faced
by women.

GENDER: “MORALLY ARBITRARY” AND ASSIGNED AT BIRTH

In my definition, I refer to gender as a “morally arbitrary” characteristic. For
context, this phrase has its roots in John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. In considering
distributive justice, Rawls asserts that, “no one deserves his place in the distribution of
natural assets any more than he deserves his initial starting place in society (Rawls 274).”
In Rawls’ view, the unearned advantages that some of us have, whether it be natural
talent, familial heritage, or race just to name a few, should have no impact on the
“distributive shares” that we receive in a just society (Rawls 274). As Rawls puts it, “the
initial endowment of natural assets and the contingencies of their growth and nurture in
early life are arbitrary from a moral point of view (Rawls 274).” Moreover, in the original
position, behind the veil of ignorance, “morally arbitrary” characteristics are supposed to
be obscured so that participants will make rational decisions informed by the recognition
that they could potentially find themselves in the position of the most disadvantaged
(Rawls 118-119).
In Justice, Gender, and the Family, Okin highlights the shocking lack of attention
that gender receives in the rest of A Theory of Justice, which may escape those reading
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the text with an inattention to gender and feminist theory (Okin 91). As Moller Okin
points out Rawls fails to explicitly mention gender in his discussion of morally
arbitrary/irrelevant characteristics (Moller Okin 91). Moreover, Rawls also leaves the
family outside the scope of justice by assuming it to be a just institution (Okin 97).
Consequently, by assuming the family to be a just institution, Rawls ensures that gender
based injustice will persist even after the application of his two principles of justice (Okin
99). This assumption is particularly concerning in the context of Rawls’ framework
considering that he holds the family to be the primary institution responsible for the
moral education of children (Okin 98). However, if the family fails to be just, then
children are likely internalizing injustice from a morally corrupt source (Okin 100).
Nevertheless, Okin acknowledges that, “Rawls has made it clear that sex is one
of those morally irrelevant contingencies that are hidden by the veil of ignorance (Okin
91).” However, she contends that it is possible that gender is not a morally arbitrary
characteristic as understood in the context of the original position (Okin 102). This
objection finds is rooted in the idea that a “morally irrelevant characteristic” is one that
exists “such that human beings really can hypothesize ignorance of this fact about them
(Okin 105).” In line with other feminist thinkers, Okin asserts that women have a
“distinct standpoint” that cannot be properly accounted for without the actual inclusion of
women (Okin 106-107). For this reason, even if the family is subject to Rawls’ two
principles and gender is hidden by the veil of ignorance, it is entirely possible that gender
injustice will persist (Okin 101-102). As Okin argues, dismantling this form of injustice
requires that “those in the original position must take special account of the perspective
of women (Okin 102). If this task is not one that men can accomplish and can only be
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done by women because of the specificity of their lived experience, it would seem that
holding gender to be “morally irrelevant” in the Rawlsian sense still presents profound
challenges to the attainment of justice.
My inclusion of the term “morally arbitrary” is not a repudiation of this argument
by Moller Okin. I certainly agree, and will specifically acknowledge multiple times in
this paper, that one consequence of gender is the development of uniquely male and
female standpoints. I use the phrase to make clear that gender should not dictate our life
prospects, what we deserve, or what we receive. In other words, I use this term to further
tie my argument to the broader discourse of distributive justice. Critically, “what we
receive” does not only refer to wealth, but also respect, autonomy, and opportunities to
define the ends we wish to pursue in life. If we accept gender as a “morally arbitrary”
characteristic in this sense, then there is an injustice in using this characteristic as the
basis for the distribution of social goods. Likewise, if gender is morally arbitrary, then
using it as a basis for the delegation of “duties, privileges and expectations” is also
clearly wrong.
Now turning to perhaps the most controversial part of my definition, I state that
gender is based on “biological sex assigned at birth.” However, as I mentioned in my
introduction, many readers may feel that this definition is uninclusive of transgender
people. I again want to emphasize that this is because I have sought to give an operational
definition of gender rather than a normative one. My intention has been to define gender
in its most traditional sense, with a particular focus on the ways in which gender degrades
agency and human dignity. My definition is a reflection of how gender has historically
functioned and continues to operate, rather than what gender should be (if it should exist
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at all). Undeniably, transgender people have been marginalized within the orthodox
gender binary. Often times, this exclusion is accompanied by tragic, pervasive violence,
particularly for transgender black women.
With this in mind, a historical, operative definition of gender that is inclusive of
transgender individuals actually erases the struggles that this particularly vulnerable
group faces. If discrimination and violence against transgender people is a product of our
current unjust construction of gender, than this fact must be reflected in the definition.
The most logical way to go about this is to create an operational definition that reflects
the exclusion that transgender people face in their daily lives. Anything else would be
ahistorical, as well as a disservice to all though that continue to face oppression under the
gender binary. Once more, my definition of gender is intended to reflect an unjust history
of patriarchy for the sake of theorizing on why and how we must deconstruct this
understanding. Just as my recognition of gender’s inherent power imbalance in favor of
men does not mean that I believe this is just, my definition should not be understood to
invalidate transgender people’s identities.
It is with this context that I define one fundamental characteristic of gender as
being the linkage with biological sex assigned at birth. To reiterate, biological sex is a
scientific observation (despite the fact that many individuals exist outside of the binary of
male/female), while gender is a socially constructed concept that normatively defines
individuals postitions within the world. The idea of assignment at birth is also reflected in
Susan Moller Okin’s understanding when she states that gender is the ““ascriptive
designation of positions and expectations of behavior in accordance with the inborn
characteristic of sex (Okin 103).” Here the phrase “inborn charecteristic of sex”
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corresponds with my idea of “assigned at birth.” Based on this characteristic, individuals
then have forced upon them a normative conception of their role in relation to all other
humans. It is this coercive designation that is gender. In this way, gender as traditionally
definied must be account for sex as the basis for the delegation of gender roles and
expectations. Following this initial assignment of sex and subsequently gender, we are
raised in ways that only enforce and entrench our gender identities.
As with other components of my definition of gender, if we erode the linkage
between biological sex and gender, then we are actively participating in the
deconstruction of gender. In this way, transgender people’s pursuit of their personal turth
is a courageous, revolutionary act that erodes the linkage of sex and gender, and thereby
gender itself. Challenging the automatic delegation of gender based on biological sex
fundamentally undermines the idea that gender is based on sex assigned at birth, which is
a central feature of gender more broadly. Clearly, the courage and societal acceptance of
transgender and nonbinary individuals continuously moves us towards a less restrictive
understanding of gender.The erosion described above is only one of the multiple ways
that gender is being deconstructed. This process of deconstruction can also be termed
“gender abolition,” and is the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2: Gender Abolition
Having established an operative definition of gender, it is now time to define gender
abolition. In this chapter, I begin by establishing that, as a social creation, we have the
ability to collectively deconstruct gender. I then establish that there are certain
constitutive elements of gender without which gender ceases to exist in any recognizable
form. I argue that achieving this amounts to genderlessness, which is the ultimate aim of
gender abolition. When understood from this angle, gender abolition is not nearly as
radical of a concept as it sounds, and in fact is identical to much more moderate notions
such as egalitarianism. I then introduce the two different processes through, which I
contend gender can be fully deconstructed.
Specifically, I posit that gender abolition can occur either through the erosion of
the linkage of biological sex and gender, or by dismantling the delegative aspect of
gender that assigns duties, privleges and expectations. Looking first at the uncoupling of
biological sex and gender, I argue that, aside from questions of justice, the assignment of
biological sex is a deeply flawed concept that fails to map onto gender in any coherent
way, as is evidenced in the erasure of intersex and transgender people. For this reason, we
should avoid gendering children at birth, while normalizing and affirming peoples’ right
to transition to live in accordance with their self identity. I conclude the chapter by
focusing on abolition of the delegative aspect of gender drawing upon Cheryll Harris’
Whiteness as Property and Angela Davis’ Women and Capitalism. Ultimately, this
chapter is intended to lay the foundations for my subsequent analysis of the implicit calls
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for gender abolition found in Karl Marx and Amartya Sen’s distinct visions of human
development.

What is Gender Abolition?

What precisely is meant by gender abolition? Recall in my previous chapter I
defined gender as the societally and institutionally enforced construct that delegates
duties, privileges, and expectations based on biological sex assigned at birth. I also
emphasize that gender is taught and entrenched as children grow up, as failure to conform
behaviors with gender-based expectations can have dramatic social, economic and legal
ramifications. I bring up these two clauses because they clearly put forward the idea that
gender is a social creation, rather than an inescapable fact of human existence. The first
clause simultaneously distinguishes between and connects biological sex with gender,
which is the attached normative set of duties and expectations created by humans. As a
creation of humans, it is apparent that gender could be constructed in an entirely different
way.
The implications of holding gender as a social construction are briefly explored
by Oyèrónkẹ Oyèwùmí in Visualising the Body. Oyèwùmí argues that, because gender is
created by humans, its construction must vary “across time and space (Oyèwùmí 463).
Additionally, conceiving of gender in this way also suggests that there was a time before
the existence of gender (Oyèwùmí 464). Perhaps most importantly to the overall aim of
this thesis, with this recognition it would seem theoretically possible to transcend beyond
gender and return to a state of genderlessness.
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The second clause that I have restated above is intended to illuminate the primary
mechanism through which the patriarchal construction of gender that has become nearly
universal is maintained. As a social construction, gender must be maintained through
affirmations and sanctions that enforce individuals’ adherence to their assigned social
roles. As Judith Lorber points out, this process begins at birth as exemplified in “the
choice of names, blankets, and clothing (Hughes and Dvorsky 7). Critically, if there was
no enforcement of gender, gender would no longer exist in any recognizable form.
Opponents of this perspective often point to physical differences between the
sexes as evidence that gender is natural and does not necessitate maintenance, instead
holding that it is an immutable biological reality. However, while biological variation
certainly exists between the sexes, we should not mistake this as constituting gender in
and of itself. As Brian D. Earp points out in Abolishing Gender,
Even if there is some biological basis to the mental association people have
between certain traits and masculinity or femininity, it wouldn’t entitle us to jump
from a descriptive “is” to a prescriptive “ought” (that is, to a socially enforced
set of rules for how males or females should act, think, feel, or relate to others).”
- (Earp 5-6)
In other words, the inequality of the genders is not found in difference between men and
women alone, but instead within the normative force that underlies the concept. With this
in mind, it is clear that a genderless society would not neccessarily need to be
androgynous. Instead, what is more important is people's ability to freely choose what
they value and exercise free agency. To connect this back to my broader point, the
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enforcement of gender from the time we are children is perhaps the greatest impediment
to the realization of this worthy end.
Fundamentally, we exist within a gendered world, and more specifically a
patriarchal world. This particular construction is what Earp refers to as the Dominant
Gender Ideology (DGI) (Earp 3). As I mentioned in the previous chapter, this reality is
reflected in everything from men’s economic and social domination to the
disproportionate delegation of domestic labor to women, as well as the different virtues
that men and women are supposed to cultivate to name just a few manifestations. On a
deeper level, Earp points out that living in a gendered world effectively means that
“knowing what someone’s genitals look like” has “predictive value for guessing their
style of dress, their grooming habits, their physical mannerisms, sexual preferences,
career ambitions, psychological profile, or ways of interacting with others (Earp 7).” I
feel this point is extremely compelling in that it illuminates the absurdity of a concept
that we largely take for granted assuming gender to be natural. What does someone’s
genitals have to do with their career ambitions? Nothing absent the construction of
gender.
Now, if our society failed to be gendered, then we could say that gender has been
“abolished (Earp 2).” This is the sense in which I use the term gender abolition. To have
abolished gender is simply to live in a genderless soceity. In other words, the construction
of gender has been dismantled. In the following pages, I argue that this occurs in two
distinct ways. Gender can be deconstucted either through the erosion the linkage between
biological sex assigned at birth and gender, or by changing the relationships of
dominance and subservience and their respective duties and expectations that charecterize
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the traditional gender binary. I will explore this topic in greater depth in the following
pages, but here I must make explicit an intimately related point.
With this understanding of the nature of complete gender abolition, it follows that
any act that moves us towards genderlessness is an act of abolition. More specifically,
whatever deteriorates the force of the linkage between biological sex and normative
societal expectation (gender) constitutes gender abolition. In the same way, altering the
specific duties, privileges and expectations in a way that subverts our present
construction of gender qualifies as abolition. Perhaps the most important takeaway here is
that abolition does not require an immediate, total departure from gender. This
uncharitable view is somewhat understandable given the history and power associated
with a word like abolition. Nevertheless, abolition in the context of this thesis refers to
the gradual process of degendering society. If this process is completed to its fullest
extent, then the result is genderlessness and thus complete gender abolition.
As I have alluded to above, the idea represented by the phrase “gender abolition”
can be expressed with different language. Gender abolition is perhaps the most radical
way of expressing this ideal, however more moderate articulations such as “gender
egalitarianism” still express essentially the same message (Olin Wright). This is the core
contention in Erik Olin Wright’s In Defense of Genderlessness. Wright argues that
“while promoting gender equality moves us in the direction of egalitarian ideals,
ultimately these ideals involve the dissolution of gender...policies which
effectively neutralize the inegalitarian effects of the gender relations will also
tend to undermine the norms which reproduce those relations. In the long term,
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therefore, serious gender egalitarian policies will also undermine gender” - (Olin
Wright)
Here, Olin Wright’s argument hinges on the fact that gender is necessarily incompatible
with the concept of egalitarianism. If we desire equality between the sexes, this cannot
exist so long as gender endures. This fits neatly with my definition which emphasizes that
one of the constitutive components of gender is normative differentiation between the
sexes with regards to expectations, duties and privileges to the benefit of men. Although
Olin Wright never uses the term abolition explicitly, his point largely mirrors my
contention in the preceding paragraph that abolition is any act that furthers the end of
genderlessness.
With this in mind, it is apparent that gender abolition and gender
equality/egalitarianism are merely different ways of articulating the same goal, insofar as
gender equality is an oxymoron. To reiterate, gender abolition is the complete cultivation
of a genderless society. Keeping this in mind, full realization of gender
equality/egalitarianism is impossible given that gender is inseparable from inequality
definitionally speaking. Opponents of this view may object that it is possible to have a
construction of gender that is equal, or at the least more equal than the present
manifestation. However, if gender failed to be unequal it would no longer exist in any
recognizable form. Moreover, any partial realization of gender equality (meaning
progress from our current position) would be an act of abolition in that the subsequent
construction of gender would more closely align with the ultimate goal of genderlessness.
Before delving more deeply into my view on the process of gender abolition, I
want to briefly touch on a few more terms that closely relate to and resemble this
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concept. Throughout this thesis, I speak of the deconstruction of gender. By
deconstruction, as with abolition, I am referring to a process that leads us in the direction
of genderlessness. Here, my rationale is largely based upon Oyèrónkẹ Oyèwùmí
contention that if gender is a social construct, there was once a prior time during which
gender existed in a radically different form. This brings me to my next term. In this
context, to deconstruct is also to dismantle gender. In subsequent chapters, I will use
these two terms interchangeably. As with deconstruction, dismantling gender furthers the
achievement of the genderless society that abolition requires.
While I will not use the next two terms, they are still worth bringing up given
their relevance to feminist discourse broadly. Gender eliminativism, referring to the
elimination of gender, mirrors the concept of abolition. Not to belabor this point, if
gender is eliminated it no longer exists and thus genderlessness has been achieved. In this
way, gender eliminativism is indistinguishable from gender abolition. Similarly,
postgenderism is focused on exploring what exactly a completely genderless world would
look like, but is distinct in the sense that proponents of this view would emphasize the
importance of controlling for the physical differences between the sexes (Hughes and
Dvorsky 2).
As Hughes and Dvorsky articulate in Postgenderism: Beyond the Gender Binary,
“postgenderism confronts the limits of a social constructionist account of gender and
sexuality, and proposes that the transcending of gender by social and political means is
now being complemented and completed by technological means.” This is slightly
different from the view of abolition that I put forward in that my framework is based
upon acceptance of the idea that gender can be dismantled while allowing physical
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difference to persist. Referring to physical/biological difference, perhaps the most
important consideration from a postgenderist perspective is women’s capacity for
childbirth, while attention is also given to issues such as agressions’ relation to
testosterone (Highes and Dvorsky 10-13).
Overall, the main point that I have been trying to drive home thus far is that
gender abolition is not as radical of a concept as it sounds (not that there is anything
wrong with something being radical). Gender abolition could equally be termed gender
equality or gender egalitarianism. Very few people would have any problems with these
terms. However, I eschew the use of these terms given their internal logical inconsistency
rooted in the reality that gender cannot exist absent inequality. At the very same time, my
analysis suggests that gender equality may require much more than what people typically
think. Certainly, many proponents of gender justice believe that the categories of “man”
and “woman” can continue to persist while people with these identities are treated
equally. However, this is antithetical to the understanding of gender put forward in this
thesis. The categories of man and woman inherently imply both inequality and hierarchy.
Therefore, approaching any semblance of equality necessitates the deconstruction of
gender. While concrete steps towards abolition may be much more mundane than we
typically believe, full actualization of the end of gender equality requires a radical shift in
how we order society.
The primary aim of gender abolition is the creation of a genderless society, which
does not mean an androgynous one. Instead, a genderless society would be one in which
people interact as equals without force of normative expectations assigned based upon
genetalia. While the use of the term “abolition” certainly calls to mind legal action, this
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does not mean that identification with gender will be punished in the courts. This is not to
say that we cannot move towards abolition through legal avenues, but rather the process
of abolition also occurs in much more diffuse and subtle ways within social institutions.

Uncoupling Sex and Gender

As I see it, there are two primary processes through which gender may be
dismantled. Firstly, gender abolition can occur through the erosion of the linkage between
assigned biological sex and the normative social roles associated with gender. If assigned
biological sex no longer serves as the basis of gender roles, people would theoretically be
able to freely choose what gender role to inhabit. Beyond the fact that the imposition of
gender based upon assigned biological sex represents a significant form of unfreedom,
assigning sex at birth and linking it to gender is also flawed in its erasure of intersex
people. Critically, with this understanding of gender abolition, transgender people are a
part of a fundamentally revolutionary act of deconstruction.
It is also important to recognize that this assignment and linkage does not only
occur at birth. Instead, the linkage between sex and gender is entrenched over time as
gender is enforced throughout childhood, which brings me to my second point. Abolition
can also function through weakening the delegative/distributive aspect of gender. In other
words, if gender no longer functions as the basis for the delegation of duties,
expectations, and privileges as I mention in my definition, then what is left no longer
constitutes gender. This can occur through deconstructing the norms and expectations
associated with gender directly.
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As I mentioned in the preceding chapter, one of the fundamental components of
gender is its linkage to biological sex assigned at birth. While I explicitly drew upon the
work of Susan Moller Okin in the last chapter to support the fact that this is a key part of
gender, this view is widely accepted throughout feminist literature. To further support
this position with the work of an author cited in this chapter, Brian D. Earp defines sex as
“roughly, the physical or biological distinction between females and males,” which is
“linked to socially enforced gender roles that prescribe how people should be and behave
(Earp 1).” While phrased slightly differently, this fits neatly with my definition of gender
and more specifically with my discussion of this very subject in the final paragraphs of
chapter one. To briefly reiterate, gender connects individuals’ biological sex with social
expectations and positionality. At its core, gender holds biological sex as the foundational
way of ordering the delegation of gender roles and expectations.
Critically, individuals initially have no choice what gender they exist in within the
world. It is not until people have the vocabulary to articulate their feelings and interests
that this immediate linkage can be challenged in any way (absent remarkably
unconventional parents). Problematically, people generally embrace the gender they are
assigned (there are more cisgender than transgender or nonbinary people), given the years
of conditioning we recieve. This is particularly concerning given that, as I have argued,
gender is inherently hierarchical. This means that around half of our population has been
assigned a position of servility based on the morally arbitrary characteristic of sex. The
enforcement of this injustice is so pervasive that we often fail to question and critique the
basis of this designation.
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As Susan Moller Okin states, the Rawlsian idea of fair equality of opportunity
mandated by his second principle which states that, “Social and economic inequalities are
to be arranged so that they are…attached to positions and offices open to all (Rawls 53)"
is incompatible with our current construction of gender (Okin 103). Moller Okin points
out that “positions and offices” must include gender positions such as “husband and wife
[or] mother and father (Okin 103).” No one would dispute that these gender roles form
the basis of significant “social and economic inequalities,” particularly considering the
domestic burden women shoulder under the traditional construction of gender (Okin
103). Recognizing this fact, adherence to Rawls second principle requires “choice of
occupation of both sexes (Okin 103).” This choice does not truly exist within the current
coercive definition of gender that ascribes different conceptions of a proper life for men
and women as defined by their biological sex assigned at birth.
Another crucial reason we have to reject the linkage between biological sex and
gender relates to the erasure of intersex individuals. In its most restrictive yet pervasive
form (what Earp terms DGI), gender exists within a binary with the categories of man
and woman (Montañez). However, we must recognize that, despite what we have been
conditioned to believe, sex is not actually a binary (Montañez). Instead, as Amanda
Montañez points out in Beyond XX and XY: The Extraordinary Complexity of Sex
Determination, “determination of biological sex is staggeringly complex, involving not
only anatomy but an intricate choreography of genetic and chemical factors that unfolds
over time (Montañez).” She then follows this statement by defining intersex individuals
as “those for whom sexual development follows an atypical trajectory (Montañez).” This
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can range from differences in hormonal levels to “ambiguous genitals” to the presence of
both male and female reproductive organs (Montañez).
It is important to note that intersex individuals are not merely a medical anomoly.
In fact, as Hughes and Dvorsky point out, nearly 1.7% of the population may be intersex
depending on what definition is used (Hughes and Dvorsky 3). If we take a more narrow
view of intersexuality, defined as “conditions in which the person's chromosomes are a
different sex than their phenotypic sex characteristics, or in which they have truly
ambiguous genitalia,” the number is likely closer to 0.02% or roughly one in every 5,000
children (Hughes and Dvorsky 3).
Nevertheless, sex is generally assigned based on genetalia at birth which is an
incomplete picture at best (Montañez). As Montañez points out, this often leads to
individuals having a gender chosen for them that does not align with their ultimate
identity (Montañez). It is evident that the automatic linkage of assigned biological sex
and gender is extremely problematic. At the most basic level, the concepts of sex and
gender do not even map onto one another cleanly. We have far more than two sexes, yet
we try to fit everyone into a gender binary at birth.
One particularly dire consequence of this imposition of the gender binary is the
reality that many intersex children have surgery at birth in order to literally mold their
bodies to fit a “normative version of one or the other gender (Hughes and Dvorsky 3).”
Many intersex activists vehemently oppose this inherently unconsensual practice for a
wide variety of reasons ranging from “reduce[d] adult sexual sensitivity” to the reality
that many individuals will be “assigned a gender at variance to their chromosomal sex or
adult psychological gender identity (Hughes and Dvorsky 3).” Additionally, perhaps the
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most relevant reason from an abolitionist perspective is the contention that “there is no
need to encourage children to ever choose either male or female gender roles (Hughes
and Dvorsky 3).”
Here, it is essential that I point out that not every culture has conceived of the
linkage between gender and sex within a restrictive and inaccurate binary. Oyèrónkẹ
Oyèwùmí reminds us that throughout human history a variety of cultures have included a
“third” or “alternative” sex/gender (Oyèwùmí 465). Evidence of this phenomena exists as
far back as Mesopotamian and ancient Egyptian society (Hughes and Dvorsky 4). One
prominent example of a “third gender” among non western cultures cited by both
Oyèwùmí as well as Hughes and Dvorsky is the Berdache. As Hughes and Dvorsky
explain, “both males and females became berdache by cross-dressing, and there was no
necessary relationship of their status to their physiology or sexual preferences (Hughes
and Dvorsky 4). Within these cultures, the third sex/gender typically had their own
unique social roles (Hughes and Dvorsky 3). While we certainly have reason to object to
the delegation of social roles in this way on its own, leaving space for a third sex/gender
is undeniably more inclusive for intersex individuals.
However, it is also imperative that we recognize that under my definition, the
presence of a “third gender” would actually mean that the three social categories would
not actually constitute gender. This contention is supported by Oyèwùmí who reminds us
that “the Western cultural system, which uses biology to map the social world, precludes
the possibility of more than two genders because gender is the elaboration of the
perceived sexual dimorphism of the human body into the social realm (Oyèwùmí 465).”
In other words, because Oyèwùmí recognizes that the dominant gender ideology imposed
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by the west (what I refer to as simply gender) is based on a linkage with a binary
conception of biological sex, a schema that accomodates three genders cannot consitute
gender as such. What exists in these cultures is not gender as I have defined. The
existence of a third gender fundamentally undermines the binary conception of gender
that is linked to biological sex.
Of course, one may object that it is possible that something that resembles gender
could be constructed in a hierarchical, trinary manner. While this sort of construction
would likely be objectionable in its own right, it would also lack some of the binding
force that makes gender such a restrictive concept. The existence of a third gender would
weaken the force of the linkage between biological sex and gender, and could allow for
men and women to more easily opt out of their assigned social roles. This is particularly
true if the third gender was not attached to any biological indicators. If the third gender
could be freely inhabited by any individual, then there would immediately be much
greater fluidity and choice in how people live their lives.
However, this third gender could certainly be reserved for intersex people
specifically. Still, even in this case, the very existence of a third gender would complicate
society's reliance on visual cues in the practice of gendering. There are many intersex
people whose appearance embodies our paradigmatic view of what women and men
should look like. If these people are suddenly sorted into a third gender, many people’s
eyes would be opened with regard to how flawed our reliance on visual cues is for
gendering. Here, it is worth pointing out that, in this scenario, we could rapidly head
down a dystopian path where genital examinations are used to assign gender as recent
legislation in Florida reminds us. This certainly would not be the liberatory shift that I
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mention above. Yet, absent this invasive policing of bodies, a third gender that
acknowledges the existence of intersex people would fundamentally alter the way most
people understand the constructed categories of woman and man.
Keeping in mind my stated definition of gender abolition, it is clear that
attempting to account for and stop the erasure of intersex people within the gender binary
is an act of abolition. Eroding the linkage between assigned biological sex and gender is a
deconstructive act leading us to a point more near to genderlessness. In affirming the
existence of intersex people, the linkage aspect of gender begins to fall apart. If we cease
to assign intersex people a binary sex at birth, there is no basis for the subsequent
assignment of gender and its associated duties, expectations and privleges. So, it follows
that one way that we can move towards abolition in a relatively small way is by breaking
from the reductive, inaccurate binary conception of sex.
More robustly, if we come to accept that we should not impose gender on intersex
people in this way, we must question why it is permissible to gender children even when
there is no sexual ambiguity. Some may argue that intersex individuals are an exceptional
case because through surgically imposing one sex where there exists ambiguity we may
“get it wrong” and choose a sex that will not align with individuals future identity.
However, the existence of transgender people affirms that sex itself is an imperfect
predictor of peoples’ gender idenity. Accordingly, we should not only avoid gendering
intersex individuals, but all children.
As I mentioned in my previous chapter, the increasing acceptance and visibility
transgender people, like intersex people, represents a brave and revolutionary act of
gender abolition. Recall in the previous chapter, the fact that my definition of gender
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assumes a linkage with biological sex in a way that marginalizes transgender people is
not a normative statement, but rather a reflection of the historical reality of transgender
peoples social exclusion. Also, I should add that I do not intend to suggest that trans
peoples’ gender identity is any less “real” than cisgender people. Instead, through
affirming transgender peoples identities we are offered a new way of imagining gender
that is closer to genderlessness than the patriarchal order that charecterizes the
contemporary dominant gender ideology.
With this being said, it is undeniable that the existence of transgender people
challenges the linkage of biological sex and gender. Transgender people transition from
their originally assigned gender to embrace an identity that aligns with their internal self
(Hughes and Dvorsky 6-7). As gender is initially determined on the basis of biological
sex, to transition is to erode the linkage between the two concepts. Because this linkage is
at the core of what defines gender, transitioning must be understood as an act of gender
deconstruction. Unfortunately, as I mention in my definition, deviations from the
established construction of gender imposes real costs on those who fail to conform, as we
see tradically exemplified in the incredible amount of violence faced by transgender
people.
To sum up my overall argument in this section, I argue one major avenue towards
gender abolition involves the erosion of the linkage between sex and gender. We can
deconstruct this aspect of gender by either ceasing to establish the linkage in the first
place, or by rejecting the linkage once life is already in progress. My example of intersex
individuals demonstrates that biological sex does not even map onto gender, so this
linkage unsound from a purely scientific perspective. Moreover, even when there is no
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ambiguity with regards to biological sex, this concept is still an inaccurate predictor of
gender identity, so it would follow that we should refrain from gendering all babies, not
just intersex babies. On the side of things, transgender people are at the forefront of
dismantling the linkage of sex and gender after the initial assignment at birth.
Transgender peoples’ bravery moves us in the direction of genderlessness in the sense
that gender assumes the linkage of biological sex and gender. In both cases, we see
clearly that abolition can occur through dismantling the assumed linkage of biological sex
and the assignment of gender roles.

Deconstructing Gendered Delegation

The second way we can progress towards gender abolition is by dismantling the
unequal assignment of distinct duties, expectations and privileges implied by gender.
This effectively amounts to weakening the delegative aspect of gender. If gender ceases
to serve as the basis for the delegation of social roles as explained in the previous chapter,
then what remains no longer fits with the patriarchal construction of gender. For example,
if the gendered concept motherhood no longer implies a disproportionate share of
domestic labor to the detriment of women (and the opposite for fatherhood), then what
we are left with is the gender neutral concept of parenthood.
The most direct path towards abolition requires the dismantling of the delegation
of duties, privileges and expectations that define gender. Even if we weaken the
automatic linkage of biological sex and gender, the social roles assigned by gender still
perpetuate unjust inequality between men and women. This may cease to be true if the
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linkage of biological sex and gender was entirely eradicated as individual’s social
position would be more consensual as people would be free to choose their gender as
they please. However, because gender is still deeply ingrained globally, if we accept
genderlessness as a worthy end then, pragmatically speaking, we should not limit the
scope of our efforts to one avenue alone. Instead, it is essential that we detach normative
conceptions of what constitutes proper behavior from gender.
Essentially, this means that whether someone identifies as a man or woman
should have no correlation with how they are expected to order their lives. As is the case
with uncoupling sex and gender, if gender roles were entirely deconstructed the result
would be genderlessness because even if we still relied on a faulty conception of
biological sex it could not be assigned to any tangible gender roles. In this way, any act
that detaches external social expectations from gender, and to humanity generally, is an
act of abolition.
To offer a parallel argument in support of this conclusion, consider the
construction of race in America. As is the case with gender, race is a social construction
as opposed to an immutable biological fact (Gannon, Scientific American). In fact,
members from different races may share more genetic similarities than with other
members of their own race (Gannon). As a social creation, in the same way as with
gender, race necessarily varies in its construction across cultures and throughout history.
Yet, in the cases of both race and gender, phenotypic differences obscure and legitimate
the inequalities engendered by the degrading constructions of these two social categories
(Harris 1778). For this reason, it is easy to overlook the various components of the
construction of race and gender, particularly for those who benefit most.
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What are the defining features of whiteness in the American context? As Cheryl
Harris argues in Whiteness as Property, whiteness in the United States is rooted in
exclusivity, power, domination as well as immense privilege that the courts have long
protected as a property right (Harris 1714-1715). This closely mirrors the functioning of
the delegative aspect of gender mentioned above. Harris explores the historical evolution
of the American construction of whiteness which, as the title makes clear, is intimately
connected with property. Harris points out that, at the inception of colonial America, race
was a radically different concept compared to today, or even 100 years later (Harris
1715-1716).
Racialization, which is tantamount to the construction of race, served to justify
attrocities like slavery and genocide (Harris 1715). Undoubtedly, “the construction of
white identity... [was] intimately tied to the evolution and expansion of the system of
chattel slavery (Harris 1717).” This is exemplified in the fact that whiteness came to be
synonymous with freedom, while blackness “marked who was subject to enslavement
(Harris 1718).” Critically, the construction of whiteness in the United States has evolved
over the centuries, yet significant aspects of whiteness endure (Harris 1778). As Harris
puts it, "Over time [whiteness] has changed in form, but it has retained its essential
exclusionary character and continued to distort outcomes of legal disputes by favoring
and protecting settled expectations of white privilege (Harris 1778)." Harris holds that
this is clearly seen in the legal repudiation of affirmative action cases that challenge the
unjust “baseline” of white privilege (Harris 1778).
Nevertheless, over time whiteness and attached delegation of social position has
been deconstructed, even if only to a minimal degree. For example, the literal abolition of
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slavery deconstructed whitness in the sense that whiteness could no longer be understood
as a “shield from slavery (Harris 1720).” This is not to say that slavery was truly
abolished at this moment as the prison industrial complex reminds us every day.
However, slavery was no longer explicitly tied to race, but instead to criminality and thus
indirectly to race. More powerfully, Harris posits that affirmative action has the potential
to deconstruct whiteness by “ de-legitim[izing] the assumptions surrounding existing
inequality (Harris 1778).” In this way, to delegitimize the property interest in whiteness is
to dismantle whiteness itself as constructed in the United States (Harris 1779). To apply
this more specifically to the case of gender abolition, the dismantling of constitutive,
delegative elements of a social construction like race necessarily erodes the force of the
social category in question.
If we fully dismantle whiteness in this sense, what is left? If whiteness no longer
serves no longer serves to reify power and privilege then all that remains is a
pseudoscientific category based on the predominance of skin color over all other traits.
While people might hear “abolish whiteness” and be freaked out (especially in the
context of culture wars) the core message, as is the case with gender abolition, is that if
racial justice is attained it requires the deconstruction of the constitutive aspects of race,
which is privilege as opposed to skin color. Certainly, in this case there will continue to
be people who physically possess the characteristics associated with whiteness. However,
without the attached property interests and social privileges, these individuals would not
be “white” and instead just human. The phenotypic associated with their “whiteness”
would have no bearing on their social position.
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Returning to my argument regarding the abolition of gender via the
deconstruction of the delegative aspect of gender, as I previously established gender is
socially constructed in very much the same way as race. Moreover, as I have established
in my definition offered in chapter one, gender, as is the case with race, is intimately
related to domination, privilege and expectations of self and others. In Women and
Capitalism, Angela Davis explores women’s oppression and their potential for liberation
through a Marxist lens. However, as my next chapter puts forward my own feminist
reading of Marx’s work, here I will limit my focus to Davis’s suggestions for the
women’s movement, rather than her specific analysis of Marx. Overall, I aim to illustrate
the nature of abolition in the context of the gendered assignment of social roles
I want to begin by highlighting some important similarities between Davis’s
observations and my definition of gender. First, Davis certainly conceives of gender as a
social construction. This is evidenced by her statement that “human beings are not
inexorably yoked to their biological constitution... The woman-man union, in all its
dimensions, is very much mutable and always subject to social transformations (Davis
151).” Here, the fact that the relationship between men and women is “subject to social
transformations” essentially rejects determinism with regards to the meanings and values
associated with “man” and “woman.” Critically, this also implies that it is possible to
achieve a more equal, just relation between the two by altering the construction of gender
itself. This point is made even more clearly when Davis asserts “the man-woman union
will always be disfigured unless the woman has liberated herself as woman (Davis 152).”
The phrase “liberated herself as woman” here represents a call for the fundamental
reimagining of gender.
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Davis centers the economic subordination of women and its association with the
traditionally gendered family as a core constitutive element of gender. Interestingly, she
offers more support for this prominent feminist position by citing Engels, who was
surprisingly attentive to gender dynamics and injustice within the family for a man of his
time (or any time for that matter) (Davis 161). Davis reminds us that, “Engels was
essentially correct to link the inferior status of the female to the hierarchical makeup of
the family… [and] woman’s dependent rank within the family unit (Davis 161). She also
focuses on the domestic duties shouldered by women which entrenches this asymmetric
distribution of economic power stating that women “must bear the major responsibility
for the internal labor guaranteeing [the families] preservation. These private domestic
duties preclude more than marginal participation in social production (Davis 163).” She
also highlights that women’s labor outside on the market is typically undervalued and
held in disesteem relative to the work of men (Davis 163). I bring this up to say, Davis’s
conception of gender largely offers support to my own definition and analysis.
However, unlike a philosopher like Okin, Davis goes further in holding that
women’s oppression is inextricably linked with capitalism (Davis 150). According to
Davis, reform within the existing system is not possible, given that women’s participation
in the formalized economy has had “reaffirming and amplifying effects on their
oppression” for many women (Davis 170). It is with this background that Davis offers the
most manifestly abolitionist passage of the paper. She states,
“the demand for job equality - equal jobs and equal pay for the same jobs - is one
of the indispensable prerequisites for an effective women’s liberation strategy.
Such a demand, it need not be said, loses much of its meaning and can fall back
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into the orbit of person unless it is acompanied by the fight for childcare centers,
maternity leaves, free abortions and the entire complex of solutions to the
uniquely female needs...these efforts must be seen as an essential ingredient of a
broader thrust: the assault on the institutional structures which perpetuate the
socially enforced inferiority of women (Davis 171-172)”
It is here that we see more clearly what abolition through the deconstruction of the
delegative aspect of gender looks like. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the
gendered expectation that men will have a wife at home who is not engaged in the
formalized economy affects the structuring of the workplace such that it fails to be
responsive to the needs of parents (mothers) who are responsible for childcare. In this
context, a policy promoting genderlessness is one that dismantles the force of gendered
expectations and duties. If the state provides accessible childcare to all people,
motherhood need not be associated with a disproportionate share of childcare (the
traditionally gendered family necessitates that one parent sacrifice their professional
ambitions if the family cannot pay for childcare).
Obviously, gender would still endure as this is only one specific aspect, but
policies like this deconstruct the delegative aspect of gender. Therefore, this constitutes
an act of abolition. Moreover, by linking women’s oppression to capitalism (and
specifically women’s position under capitalism), Davis also effectively connects
women’s liberation to the abolition of capitalism and thus also women’s position within
capitalist society. To extend this argument further, to eliminate women’s position within
capitalism is to dismantle the gendered delegation of economic positionality for women,
which is undoubtedly an act of abolition.
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To briefly review the content and argumentation within this section, perhaps the
most direct avenue for gender abolition is through deconstruction of the delegative aspect
of gender. To be clear, what I am referring to here is the section of my definition where I
position gender as a social construct that delegates duties, privileges, and expectations
based on biological sex assigned at birth. I hold that the delegative aspect is a constitutive
element of gender such that any deconstruction is an act of abolition that furthers the end
of genderlessness. To support this conclusion, I offered a parallel argument focused on
race, another analogous social construct. Using Cheryl Harris’s Whiteness as Property, I
established that, given the fact that race has even less of a biological basis then gender,
pursuing racial equity necessitates the erosion of property interest in whiteness and thus
the abolition of whiteness. I then turned back to gender focusing on Angela Davis’s
Women in Capitalism. I offer an interpretation of Davis’s work that frames her writing
within the context of gender abolition. I argue that her critique of women’s position in
capitalist society is effectively an attack on one part of the delegative aspect which is a
constitutive aspect of gender.

CONCLUSION

To review the chapter, my argument began by establishing the idea that gender is
a social creation. As such, it follows that gender can be deconstructed. Just as there was a
time before gender, it is theoretically possible that there could be a time postgender.
Subsequently, I define gender abolition in exactly this way. While gender abolition is
certainly a very provocative term, it is really referring to the deconstruction of gender.
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Critically, terms like gender egalitarianism actually imply gender abolition if they are to
be realized to their fullest extent. In this way, gender abolition is anything that moves us
towards a genderless world. This process occurs through the erosion of the constitutive
elements of gender, such as genders delegative aspect and its linkage with biological sex.
If these elements are deconstructed, what is left is not gender. Consequently, it is
apparent that gender abolition can occur either through these two avenues.
I first challenged the justice of the linkage of assigned biological sex and gender.
As I demonstrated, the way biological sex is conceived of in relation to gender is
reductive and unscientific. This is evidenced by the existence of intersex individuals,
which should make us reconsider gendering children in the first place. With this in mind,
refusing to accept an inaccurate picture of biological sex moves us in the direction of
abolition as the two concepts no longer map cleanly onto one another. Moreover, we can
also choose to reject the linkage of biological sex and gender further along in life. It is in
this sense that transgender people are actively engaged in the revolutionary process of
gender abolition. I then shifted my concentration to the process of dismantling the
delegative aspect of gender. I held that any act that detaches external social expectations
from gender, and to humanity generally, is an act of abolition. To illustrate what this
would look like, I used examples from Cheryll Harris’ Whiteness as Property and Angela
Davis’ Women and Capitalism. With this common understanding of abolition, I am now
able to transition to my broader argument that both Marx and Sen’s visions for human
advancement imply gender abolition.
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CHAPTER 3: Marxist Argument for Gender Abolition
Would a Marxist utopia be a genderless society? In the following section, drawing
upon both On the Jewish Question or The German Ideology, I hold that Marx offers two
visions of human advancement that both strongly imply the abolition of gender.
Beginning with The German Ideology, I will argue that Marx’s call for the abolition of
the division of labor equally applies to gender. Turning to On the Jewish Question, I will
establish that the existence of gender stands in the way of Marx’s ideal of human
emancipation. Based on his condemnation of the division of labor, and his standards for
human emancipation, I argue an ideal Marxist society would require the abolition of
gender.
Karl Marx views the division of labor as the root of all inequality. Fundamentally,
the division of labor creates an unequal distribution of material goods, power, and status.
Relationships of dependence, originally created by the division of labor, over time
translate into a difference in "material power (German Ideology 197)." It is evident that
within a market higher value is placed upon certain goods and services. As society
develops, exchanges between individuals within a market will inevitably give rise to a
particular distribution of goods. At this point, the market-based inequality between
individuals creates a class-based social hierarchy (German Ideology 170). Here, we see
that the division of labor is not only the basis of distribution but inevitably creates an
"unequal distribution… of labor and its products, hence property (German Ideology
159)."
Marx characterizes the first form of property as "tribal ownership," which
involved a minimal division of labor beyond that which exists within families (German
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Ideology 151). As the population rises and different families begin to interact, "ancient
communal" ownership develops with the birth of the first cities (German Ideology 151).
It is at this stage where we can observe the first instance of private property, though Marx
notes that this is an exception to the communal ownership that characterizes the era
(German Ideology 151). Additionally, class distinction develops between master and
slave (German Ideology 151). Next comes the emergence of the feudal system, which
replaces "the directly producing class" of slaves with serfs (German Ideology 153).
Through control of the land and military might, the nobility is able to maintain their
position of control over the serfs (German Ideology 153). Gradually, monarchs acquired
larger and larger kingdoms (German Ideology 154). In the towns, guilds were beginning
to form to protect the interests of "craftsmen" who, through the accumulation of small
levels of capital, came to replicate the hierarchical structure present in the country
(German Ideology 153).
Through the accumulation of capital, we arrive at a scenario where only a certain
subset of individuals have the means to create a business, which enables them to
appropriate the labor of others, thereby amassing even more capital. The result of this
process is "the division between capital and labor (German Ideology 190)." No longer is
the laborer entitled to the products of their effort. Before humans entered into tribal
ownership the isolated individual could accumulate capital through their labor. Under
capitalism, the products of the workers' labor are alienated to the industrialist. Work no
longer translates to capital. Instead, only capital can produce capital. Clearly, the division
of labor creates a fundamentally unequal distribution of material goods within society.
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Beyond the profound economic inequality caused by the division of labor, this
practice constrains and directs individuals' thinking in a way that is incompatible with
human advancement. Marx emphasizes that the division of labor by its very nature shapes
an individual's conception of self. He explicitly states, “the division of labor only
becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labor
appears (German Ideology 159).” Initially, humans have only a rough “herd
consciousness (German Ideology 158).” As our productive capabilities increase, so too
does our consciousness (German Ideology 158). Because each individuals’ consciousness
reflects their means of material production, as the division of labor emerges individuals
are set at odds with each other. The way our social class position affects our
consciousness is evidenced in the differentiation between class interests, as exemplified
by the antagonism of town and country (German Ideology 176). The division of labor
creates specific interests situated in a particular class based context.
Similarly, the division of labor prevents individuals from living in the way they
wish. Marx argues that “each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is
forced upon him and from which he cannot escape… if he does not want to lose his
livelihood (German Ideology 160).” In this way, individuals become trapped by their
mode of production. Although they may desire to live a more dynamic and fulfilling life,
a society characterized by the division of labor only allows humans to become
accomplished within the narrow confines of what is delegated to them by the market and
class position. No longer are humans able to choose for themselves what matters, and
what is worthwhile to pursue.
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Based on this split of material and mental labor and the division of intellectual
production, the dominant class is able to impose their values, thereby creating a society
that is ordered to work to their advantage. Marx argues that the elite class, which controls
society in terms of material wealth, also controls the intellectual development of society
(German Ideology 172). The importance of this phenomenon cannot be understated.
Critically, "the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to"
the value systems put in place by the dominant class. Here, we must recognize that the
intellectual production of the elite has the effect of supporting the dominant material
relationships that already exist (German Ideology 173). The dominant classes ideology
serves to justify and legitimate their position of dominance.
What does this power look like in real life? In the context of feudalism, Marx
argues that the value placed on “honor” and “loyalty” serves to perpetuate and justify a
system that would be less likely to endure otherwise (German Ideology 173). However,
typical analysis tends to neglect the context of the roots of these created values. Failing to
recognize the way that the position of the intellectual class informs their production leads
to the faulty belief that their ideas are in the “common interest of all the members of
society (German Ideology 174).” As long as class differentiation endures, the least
advantaged will be unable to order society in accordance with what they value.
Marx also argues that the division of labor is incompatible with the development
of a world suitable for human life because it sets individuals at odds with the communal
interest, while simultaneously necessitating their cooperation. According to Marx, the
division of labor leads individuals to seek "only their particular interest, which for them
does not coincide with their communal interest (German Ideology 161)." Not only do

56

humans prioritize their self-interest over the communal interest, but the division of labor
even stifles our ability to identify with the communal interest. Marx makes this explicit
when he states that communal interest "will be imposed on them as an interest "alien" to
them, and "independent" of them (German Ideology 161)." Importantly, this dynamic
necessitates state control over individuals to maintain order.
Paradoxically, despite the divisiveness of the division of labor, it also makes a
community a necessity. Unsurprisingly, because individuals no longer capable of
producing all their material needs every individual must cooperate with others for their
sustenance. As Marx puts it, “the individuals themselves are entirely subordinated to the
division of labor and hence are brought into the most complete dependence on one
another (German Ideology 190).” It is evident that, for Marx, a society that prioritizes and
respects humans’ well being is impossible with this fundamental discord existing within
every citizen. Recognizing our interdependence, the division of labor is incompatible
with a society based in substantive communal cooperation. Accordingly, Marx argues
that the division of labor must be abolished if humans hope to reach a communist utopia
(German Ideology 197).
Given that Marx argues that the division of labor must be abolished to advance
the human condition, it is clear that gender also must be overcome. Gender is the
societally and institutionally enforced construct that delegates duties, rights, privileges,
and expectations based on biological sex assigned at birth to which an individual is
expected to conform their actions and behaviors. My definition aims to keep in mind both
the legal and social dynamics that entrench and build upon the biological differences
between the sexes. Additionally, the phrase “delegates expectations, duties, rights, and
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privileges” aims to situate my definition in the context of the discourse of distributive
justice.
There is no question that Marx believed gender to be an example of the
dehumanizing practice of the division of labor. Marx states that the division of labor "was
originally nothing but the division of labor in the sexual act (German Ideology 158).”
After this initial division based on the act of reproduction, it follows that the subsequent
birth of a child further entrenches the division of labor between partners within the
traditionally gendered family (German Ideology 151). Importantly, as Marx views the
family as the first relationship in human history, gender is fundamentally rooted in the
division of labor. At their core, gender roles assign and enforce a conception of what
work should be reasonably expected and required from an individual based on the sex
they were assigned at birth. Specifically, traditional conceptions of womanhood are based
on societally enforced domestic duties such as raising children. Importantly, unlike other
philosophers such as John Rawls, Marx does not assume the family to be just. On the
contrary, Marx explicitly states that within the traditionally gendered family “wife and
children are slaves of the husband (German Ideology 159).”
In the same way as the division of labor in general, the division of labor based on
gender roles creates deep inequality between men and women based on unequal ability to
create capital. In Justice, Gender, and the Family, Susan Moller Okin supports this
position by stating that the division of labor within the family creates “economic
dependency and restricted opportunities of most women (Okin 9).” Women's enforced
domestic roles restrict their economic horizons given that their labor takes place outside
of the market. This is a fundamental way in which gender leaves women with asymmetric
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power and agency within particular relationships, as well as society as a whole. Moller
Okin argues that marriage obscures women's disproportionate vulnerability, while at the
same time "gender structure marriage makes women vulnerable (Okin 5)." This
vulnerability becomes most apparent during divorce (Okin 5). Marx certainly recognizes
the way the enforced division of unpaid domestic labor advantages men at the expense of
women. The traditionally gendered family assumes that men have a wife at home that
takes care of all child-rearing as well as other domestic labor. This leaves men free to
devote their time to pursuing material wealth in a way that would not be possible if they
had to contribute their fair share to the family. Marx calls this “the power of disposing of
the labor power of others (Marx 159)."
In her book Why Some Things Should Not be for Sale, Deborah Satz offers yet
another example of how the division of labor based on gender leaves women with less
material power than men born into the exact same situation. Like both Marx and Okin,
Satz is clear that the traditionally gendered family cannot be assumed to be just (Satz
158). This underlying injustice is exemplified in the case of nowhere children, who are
forced to do unpaid domestic work instead of attending school or taking a job on the
market (Satz 164). Nowhere children are typically women whose unpaid domestic work
allows for her brothers to attend school without having to work (Satz 168). This is one of
the clearest manifestations of the gendered division of labor. Critically, this example
shows that women's domestic positions are not simply chosen by mothers after they have
a baby. Rather, the expectation that women should provide unpaid labor at home is
central to the traditional conception of womanhood. Satz' discussion of nowhere children
exemplifies how gender-based expectations and duties serve the purpose of empowering

59

men through "disposing of the labor power" of women. As a result, the division of labor
implicit in gender creates material inequality between men and women.
Gender, perhaps more so than the division of labor in general, shapes individuals’
consciousness in a way that is incompatible with a society fit for human life. This social
phenomenon is highlighted by many feminist thinkers including Susan Moller Okin and
Jean Hampton. Specifically, gender shapes women’s thought process to be more
collective in aim than men who typically are more individualistic. This is supported by
Moller Okin’s statement that “the socialization and role expectations of women mean that
they are generally more inclined than men not to claim their fair share, and more inclined
to order their priorities in accordance with the needs of their families (Okin 31).” While
we often think that saying there is no difference between men and women is a nonsexist
statement, this false neutrality fails to recognize one of the most significant effects of
gender.
In Feminist Contractarianism, Jean Hampton cites a study by Carol Gilligan that
concluded that gender creates distinct “interests,” like the division of labor. Hampton
uses the example of Jack and Amy to illuminate the way in which society creates distinct
ways of thinking for men and women from the time that they are children (Hampton
231). Jack’s response to the question of balancing “responsibility to oneself and
responsibility to others” prioritizes self-interest (Hampton 228). On the other hand,
Amy’s response shows much more deference to the needs of others. However, while this
may seem preferable, Amy’s answer fails to put much weight on her own desires
(Hampton 230). Unlike Jack, she is not as confident about the value of her interests.
These two contrasting responses signify two separate, gendered ways of constructing
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morality (Hampton 229). Hampton makes clear her support for the idea that gender
influences our self-conceptions of morality stating that the children’s respective answers
serve to justify their future roles as dominant/subservient (Hampton 231). Clearly, like
the division of labor in general, gender shapes the way individuals conceive of their
interests. Moreover, gender justifies and perpetuates the unequal distribution of material
power between men and women.
As Marx describes regarding the division of labor, the ruling class (in the context
of gender, men) controls intellectual production within society. Susan Moller Okin and
Jean Hampton both highlight the historical lack of representation of women in the field of
political theory (Hampton 227, Okin 8). Unsurprisingly, male-centric theories of justice
typically fail to critically engage with the question of whether gender and the traditionally
structured family can possibly be just. For example, Susan Moller Okin critiques John
Rawls' theory of justice on the basis that it leaves the family outside the scope of justice,
thereby falling into the "public domestic dichotomy (Okin 92)." By permitting the
traditionally gendered family, we can be certain that an ideal Rawlsian society would still
be plagued by sexism.
Perhaps more importantly, male domination of intellectual production has the
effect of ordering society in a way that is unresponsive to the needs of women and
undervalues the roles into which they are coerced by gender. In his work, In Defense of
Genderlessness, Erik Olin Wright describes a phenomenon called the care penalty (Olin
Wright). Wright begins by establishing the fact that gender influences women to enter
into certain fields. Specifically, the socially exaggerated stereotype that women have a
greater propensity for nurturing behavior than men has the effect of causing careers in
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care work to be disproportionately occupied by women (Olin Wright). These careers
tend to be severely underpaid as compared to their importance. Wright argues that this is
in large part because of the “cultural value,” or rather the lack thereof, placed on care
work (Olin Wright). The devaluing of this work is directly tied to misogynistic
philosophical constructions of the importance and value of different types of work. If the
division of labor had not excluded women from the intellectual production of establishing
the “cultural value” of different jobs, it is unlikely that care work would be seen as less
valuable than other forms of labor. With this in mind, it is clear that the gendered division
of labor, and the consequent limitations placed on who could engage in intellectual
production, has ordered society in a way that disadvantages women and devalues their
contributions. Clearly, in order to advance the human condition, more and more women
must engage in the work of intellectual production. In order for this to be realized,
gender, and its implied division of labor must be abolished.
Gender, in the same way as the division of labor, sets individual interest and
communal interest in opposition. Surely, the general interest cannot be interpreted to
enforce the servility of half of the population. In On the Jewish Question, Marx goes into
greater depth regarding the need for all humans to meaningfully internalize the communal
interest as inseparable from their own. This idealized human is referred to as a "species
being in contrast to "egoistic man (Jewish Question 43)." Overall, this process is called
human emancipation, which I will focus on in greater depth in the next section. Gender,
because of the way it creates a distinct egoistic psychology in men, stands in the way of a
society occupied by species-beings. For now, I will delay my analysis to more fully
explain the concept of human emancipation and its relation to gender.
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In summation, the dismantling of gender is implied and required to reach Marx’s
ideal society, which requires the abolition of the division of labor. Firstly, gender by its
very nature implies the division of labor. Marx recognizes this fact in his analysis stating
that, during tribal ownership, the division of labor grows within the family starting with
reproduction (German Ideology 151). As Marx observes of the division of labor in
general, the gendered division of domestic labor leads to an unequal distribution of
power, autonomy, and capital. Once again mirroring the broader division of labor, gender
creates distinct interests for men and women that serve to reinforce relationships of
dominance. On top of this, the dominant gender, as with class, gains the ability to control
intellectual production. Therefore, gender is one particularly pervasive example of the
division of labor. Accordingly, true abolition of the division of labor requires dismantling
gender, as gender implies and perpetuates a division of labor founded within the family
that now extends far beyond the household.
Beyond the call to abolish gender implicit in Marx’s critique of the division of
labor, his writings in On the Jewish Question suggest that, like religion, gender abolition
is necessary for human emancipation. In On the Jewish Question, Marx differentiates
between political emancipation and human emancipation. Currently, Marx would accept
that we live in a politically emancipated society, yet he would be disgusted to see how far
we are from true human emancipation. According to Marx, human emancipation is
incompatible with divisive social constructs such as religion. These institutions require
abolition to attain human emancipation as they perpetuate a wide array of divisive
tendencies, which prevents individuals from uniting their sense of collective good with
their self-interest.
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Marx defines political emancipation in opposition to the feudal order. Marx
argues that under feudalism, the whole of an individual's identity was politicized in order
to determine political rights and status (Jewish Question 44). Critically, the feudal order
limited the right to political action to the “ruler and his servants (Jewish Question 45).”
Understanding this historical context, political emancipation as defined by Marx is best
understood as the separation of the right to participate in politics from social status of an
individual within civil society. In principle, political emancipation simply delegated equal
rights under the law to all citizens, regardless of their class position or identity (Jewish
Question 45). After the political revolution, restrictions on political participation based on
culturally defined criteria, such as religion, occupation, and gender, are removed. Instead,
politics became a “matter of general concern” for every citizen (Jewish Question 45).
However, Marx argues the state of political emancipation is far from perfect and
creates unique problems apart from those present in feudal society. By making "public
affairs...the general affair of each individual," politics is reduced to a stage for the
competing interests of every egoistic individual within the state (Jewish Question 45).
Underlying this problematic phenomenon is the creation of a dichotomy between the
political community and civil society, which creates within each human a sort of dual
consciousness of citizen and private individual (Jewish Question 34). Marx's idealized
political citizen, or species being, is capable of thinking in terms of the genuine interests
of society as a whole (Jewish Question 43). In contrast, the "egoistic man" that is found
within civil society thinks only in terms of self-interest. This point is made clear when
Marx states, "the only bond between men is natural necessity, need and private interest,
the preservation of their property and their egoistic persons (Jewish Question 43). Thus,
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political emancipation removed from humans, in their practical form, any sense of a
"general good (Jewish Question 45)." Given that Marx acknowledges that political
emancipation made egoistic man the "foundation and presupposition of the political
state," politics at this stage does not aim to achieve the ideal of species life.
Moreover, Marx argues that in a politically emancipated state, all the divisive and
destructive elements that prevent human liberation are still present within civil society
(Jewish Question 34). Under political emancipation, characteristics that once determined
an individual's relation to the state are not abolished. Rather, these characteristics such as
religion, property, and gender continue to exist in significant ways within civil society
(Jewish Question 46). In fact, as exemplified in North America, the region Marx
considered to have attained the highest degree of political emancipation, religion's
separation from the realm of politics did nothing to diminish its influence (Jewish
Question 31). Critically, Marx states, "the political revolution dissolves civil society into
its elements without revolutionizing these elements themselves or subjecting them to
criticism (Jewish Question 46)." The effect of this is freedom under the law without true
freedom for the conditions of humans on the ground. As Marx put it, "a state may be a
free state without man himself being a free man (Jewish Question 32)."
On the other hand, Marx argues that human emancipation is achieved when
humans live as species-beings, as opposed to self-interested individuals. With regard to
politics, human emancipation is achieved when every individual internalizes the
mentality of the "abstract citizen (Jewish Question 46)." Here, Marx invokes Rousseau,
arguing that human emancipation occurs when individuals recognize, fully accept, and
operate as if they are "a part of something greater than [themselves] (Jewish Question
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46)." Within a society elevated to the status of human emancipation, every individual is a
species-being. This means that within every individual there is universal recognition of
the fact that every other member of society is equally valuable and deserving of respect
(Jewish Question 34).
Achieving human emancipation requires the dissolution of constructs that divide
society and encourage individuals to operate from a position of self-interest. As we have
seen, during political emancipation, all of the components of civil society continue to
influence humans' relations to one another. Moreover, during political emancipation,
these divisive characteristics are left in place without any substantial critique. So long as
these divisive features are left in place, humans cannot interact as equals. While in On the
Jewish Question Marx primarily considers religions compatibility with human
emancipation, any cultural practice that divides and perpetuates humans' egoistic, insular
nature, is antithetical to this end. Clearly, religion is not the only institution that has to be
dismantled during human emancipation. Any institution that creates a class of exclusively
self-interested individuals is against the aim of human emancipation. Here, I argue that
gender is exactly the type of social construction that must be overcome in order to
achieve human emancipation.
Currently, the status of women in the US most closely resembles political
emancipation. Although women have an equal right to political participation and
protection under the law, we still live in a deeply gendered society. While gender does
not entirely define an individual's relationship with the state, it’s enduring significance
within civil society largely mirrors Marx's observation regarding the prominence of
religion with the United States despite political emancipation. Because gender continues
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to function within civil society, humans are fundamentally still bound by the societal
expectations attached to gender, which has the effect of limiting their freedom to define
and choose what their life will be. Despite the fact that political participation is not tied to
gender, we still live in a deeply sexist society. Clearly, political emancipation does
relatively little to address the issue of gender inequality.
So long as gender exists, human emancipation will be incomplete as gender is
antithetical to the concept of species-beings. As previously noted, the socially enforced
expectations and duties tied to gender, which are placed upon individuals from early
childhood, create distinct psychologies between men and women. Recall the study by
Carol Gilligan referenced by Jean Hampton in Feminist Contractarianism. Hampton
specifically references two responses to the question of how to balance self-interest and
responsibility to others (Hampton 228). Here, it is worth noting that this question is
central to what it means to be a species-being. While we cannot be certain exactly what
Marx would say, we can be fairly sure that the appropriate response would not unduly
prioritize individual interests at the expense of communal wellbeing. Human
emancipation requires that individuals do not act only out of self-interest, but instead
view themselves as a part of a larger collective that must be taken into account during any
decision making.
With this in mind, Hampton's analysis of Carol Gilligan's study suggests that
distinct psychologies between men and women created socially through gender norms
cannot exist under human emancipation. Specifically, the male perspective as
exemplified by Jack's response fits neatly with Marx's critique of the egoism that exists
within individuals in a politically emancipated society. Most immediately, Jack's
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response is problematic because he affords his interest three times the weight as other
individuals (Hampton 228). The egoism present in Jack's archetypically male response is
exemplified in the statement that, "the most important thing in your decision should be
yourself (Hampton 228)." Critically absent from Jack's response as compared to Amy's is
any deference to the "needs of others (Hampton 229)." This type of statement
exemplifies the type of thinking that Marx believed prevented individuals from inhabiting
a world of human emancipation.
Hampton goes on to point out that the two responses reflect "the voice of a child
who is preparing to be a member of a dominating group and the voice of another who is
preparing to be a member of the group that is dominated (Hampton 231)." Here,
Hampton makes clear that the differences between Jack and Amy's responses are
fundamentally tied to their gender. Fundamentally, gender enforces behavioral
expectations and duties that shape how individuals view the world and their place within
it. More specifically, gender creates different ways of thinking between men and women
that work to legitimate, and at the same time are byproducts of, their relative positions of
dominance and subservience. As Hampton posits, gender creates within men an egoistic
psychology of entitlement. This way of thinking, as exemplified by Jack, is incompatible
with the ideal of human emancipation based on individuals' development into speciesbeings. For this reason, gender abolition is necessary to attain the ideal of human
emancipation.
On top of this reason, political emancipation on the basis of gender fails to
question whether gender is compatible with a society fit for human life. As Erik Olin
Wright points out, the idea of a society with gender equality is an "oxymoron" (Olin
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Wright). Inherently, the socially enforced behavioral norms, duties, and privileges that
define gender materially restrict the paths in life an individual can choose without
suffering social repercussions (Olin Wright). As Wright explains, "gender norms impose
real costs on people who violate those norms and this restricts access to the social means
for a flourishing life for people whose gender-linked dispositions do not correspond to
those normative expectations (Olin Wright)." Therefore, as Wright reasons, even if all
differences in power and wealth attached to gender are removed, the fact that deviation
from accepted gender roles is stigmatized and discouraged means that gender still stands
in the way of individuals pursuing their most fulfilling life. In this way, political
emancipation still leaves women within an oppressive system given that, within civil
society, operates to restrict women's actions. Moreover, attempts at remedying the
inequality implicit in gender are ineffective as long as the expectations and duties that
define gender endure. With this in mind, given that gender dramatically restricts an
individual's capacity to achieve a "flourishing life," reaching human emancipation
requires a genderless society. If not, then we must question whether a society
characterized by human emancipation is even truly fit for human life.
One may argue that it is possible to achieve equality without dismantling gender
through policies that dismantle the barriers faced by women to achieve material success.
An adherent of this perspective may contend that it is possible to dismantle the power
imbalance between men and women without totally abandoning the gendered identities of
men and women. This perspective mainly takes issue with the premise that gender is
inseparably connected to the gendered division of labor, and subsequently duties and
behavioral expectations. Importantly, this objection does not imply that gender has not
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been constructed in a deeply unequal way that advantages men at the expense of women.
Erik Olin Wright identifies this perspective as gender egalitarianism (Olin Wright).
Wright argues that, like class, gender at its core implies inequality (Olin Wright).
Recall our previously established definition of gender. How can biological sex, a morally
arbitrary characteristic that one cannot deserve, be used to determine the distribution of
power, rights, and duties in a society committed to respecting human dignity? I argue that
just as there cannot be a society with class distinction that is truly equal, neither can there
be a society with the concept of gender in which the material prospects of men and
women are indistinguishable (Olin Wright). Here, one can certainly object from a
Rawlsian perspective that inequality may be permissible if it is to the benefit of the least
advantaged. However, I maintain that ideal, Rawlsian society would still be characterized
by class distinction and inequality. This does not mean that equality is an unworthy goal.
Often, gender abolition is strawmanned as requiring that "everyone would be
androgynous in their identities and practices (Olin Wright).” In reality, gender abolition is
the process of moving towards a society in which rights and duties are not distributed on
the basis of biological sex.
In this way, policies that advance equality between men and women directly
undermine the foundations of the institution of gender (Olin Wright). For example,
Wright argues that policies that work to promote equal participation in raising children
degenders the character of domestic labor (Olin Wright). This is particularly important
considering the way in which unpaid domestic labor has historically prevented women
from being able to participate within the workforce in the same way as men. By
promoting equal participation between partners in child rearing, whether one is born with
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the ability to produce a child has a significantly reduced impact on the expectations
surrounding the proper balance between labor at home or on the market. Importantly,
gendered behavioral expectations will continue to inhibit women's ability to lead a
satisfying and fulfilling life even if economic discrimination rooted out by policies
promoting gender equality (Olin Wright). For this reason, it is important that we strive
not only to dismantle the unequal distribution of material wealth, but also the system of
expectations attached to gender that unfairly define what constitutes a proper life for an
individual based on sex (Olin Wright). Detaching biological sex from the distribution of
rights, duties, and expectations is literally the act of transcending past gender.
With this in mind, the idea that gender can endure while men and women interact
as equals is deeply flawed. While the goal of gender egalitarians is in line with that of
gender abolitionists, they fail to recognize that gender is fundamentally incompatible with
a nonsexist society. Humans cannot interact equally as long as gender continues to define
our development. Gender is constructed in a way that constrains what life is normatively
appropriate for an individual to pursue in a way that undermines men and women’s
ability to interact as free and equal moral persons. Therefore, gender egalitarians favored
policies would actually work to degender society, as they would erode the linkage
between biological sex and a defined mold of how to occupy the world properly.
Understanding this, the idea that we can achieve equality while maintaining gender is
absurd. In fact, every move towards equality slowly dismantles gender as constructed.
Without once commenting on the concept we understand today to be gender, in
On the Jewish Question and The German Ideology Karl Marx offers us a powerful,
genderless vision of what the future of humanity could be. In The German Ideology,
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Marx calls for the abolition of the division of labor based on the way in which it
inevitably creates deep economic, social and intellectual inequality. Critically, Marx
points out that the division of labor has its origins within the family, an institution that
cannot be assumed to be just. What Marx is referring to here is gender, which
normatively establishes expectations of duty and behavior on the basis of biological sex.
As I argue, gender functions in the same dehumanizing way as the division of labor as a
whole. Therefore, the division of labor cannot truly be abolished without dismantling the
concept of gender, which inherently defines a socially coercive division of labor between
men and women.
The idea of Marx supporting gender abolition is not only found in The German
Ideology. In On the Jewish Question, Marx puts forward a concept called human
emancipation, which is a step beyond human emancipation in the course of human
development. Human emancipation requires that all individuals transcend divisive social
constructs and become species-beings who are capable of genuine communal thinking.
While this piece describes the reasons why religion must be abolished, gender functions
in very much the same way. The way that gender influences individuals thinking to
maintain relationships of servility would prevent humans from becoming species-beings.
The process of dismantling gender is far less radical and abstract than it sounds.
As Erik Olin Wright puts it, "degendering would be a side effect of the pursuit of gender
equality (Olin Wright)." Clearly, many of our current policies that seek to combat sexism
are already working to create a more genderless society. Additionally, increasing
acceptance of gender fluidity exemplifies the way in which society at large is moving
towards a more genderless collective consciousness. On the surface, it may seem that
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gender fluidity still reaffirms the existence of gender. However, the idea that an
individual can detach their gender from their biological sex is deeply liberating. While
gender abolition may sound like a far fetched ideal born out of a culture of political
correctness that is often vilified as ridiculous, it seems that we are already moving
towards a genderless world, albeit inadvertently.
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CHAPTER 4: Sen
In this chapter, I focus on a different vision for human advancement. Namely,
Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom. I begin by reconstructing Sen’s argument with
particular attention to the “process” and “opportunity” aspect of freedom. These two
concepts map cleanly onto the “effectiveness” and “evaluative” reasons for the promotion
of freedom. Based on this understanding of freedom, I point out that full realization of
Sen’s vision for human development requires the elimination of forms of unfreedom. I
then establish that gender would qualify as a form of unfreedom according to Sen’s
definition. In this way, we again find in Development as Freedom an implicit argument
for gender abolition, given that, if gender ceased to be a form of unfreedom it would no
longer be recognizable as gender. I also demonstrate that promoting women’s agency
does not only benefit women, but also uplifts others. This is what is referred to as the
effectiveness reason, and lends support to the idea that gender is a form of unfreedom in
an of itself

RECONSTRUCTION OF SEN’S ARGUMENT

As the title cleanly sums up, the foundation of Amartya Sen’s Development as
Freedom is the idea that development should be understood as the process of increasing
the degree of “real freedom” that individuals enjoy within a particular society (Sen 3). To
say that a society is developing, according to Sen’s definition, has less to do with
economic growth and more to do with the increasing presence of substantive freedom.
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According to this understanding, a poorer society may have achieved a higher level of
development if their citizens' lives are characterized by a more comprehensive set of
freedoms as compared to their relatively more wealthy counterparts. This more complete,
holistic way of conceptualizing development stands in stark contrast to more traditional
notions of development that tie development to factors such as “growth of gross national
product...rise in personal incomes,... industrialization,... technological advance, or with
social modernization (Sen 3).”
Having addressed Sen’s conception of development, the question arises: what
exactly does Sen mean by “freedom?” Sen argues that freedom consists of both a
“process aspect” and an “opportunity aspect (Sen 17).” By “process,” Sen is referring to
the presence of individual agency in “actions and decisions (Sen 17).” This type of
freedom is exemplified by “political and civil rights” such as the ability to vote or to
freely enter into contracts and more broadly to choose what ends one wishes to pursue
(Sen 17). Additionally, the process aspect also refers to the ability to exercise autonomy
in civil society. This is what Sen refers to as “social choice (Sen 291) ” However, as Sen
points out, the procedural aspect is not sufficiently broad to encompass freedom on its
own. Instead, we must also consider “opportunity,” which refers to the material
conditions individuals exist within such as the presence of poverty and mortality (Sen
17). The opportunity aspect of freedom also refers to individuals abilities to achieve the
outcomes that they desire. These two aspects make clear that Sen’s definition of freedom
does not simply mean survival, but is also connected to Aristotilian notions of human
“flourishing,” as well as “capacity (Sen 24).”
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Sen also distinguishes between the “constitutive and instrumental roles of
freedom (Sen 36).” While his primary focus is the instrumental role, Sen regards the
constitutive role as framing freedom as the “primary end” of development (Sen 36). Put
simply, freedom is a worthy goal because it leaves humans better off than they would be
in its absence. In its constitutive role, freedom represents the “removal” of “deprivations”
such as hunger, violence, and political unfreedom (Sen 37). The removal of these
deprivations constitute the promotion of freedom. On the other hand, the instrumental
role of freedom views freedom as “the principle means of development (Sen 36).” While
it may seem self evident that if freedom is the end of development then it must also be a
part of the means, Sen focuses on freedom as an instrument in order to effectively
illustrate that seemingly unrelated kinds of freedom are actually intimately connected
(Sen 37). For example, as Sen points out the fact that there has never been a famine
within a functioning democracy is evidence that political freedom helps secure the
freedom from starvation, even though these may seem unrelated (Sen 51). This
perspective informs Sen’s more broad statement that “free and sustainable agency [is]... a
major engine of development (Sen 4).”
Closely related to these two roles of freedom are Sen’s two main reasons to value
freedom in promoting development. He distinguishes between the two as the “evaluative”
and “effectiveness” reasons (Sen, 4). Sen defines the evaluative reason as, “assessment of
progress has to be done primarily in terms of whether the freedoms that people have are
enhanced (Sen 4). More importantly, central to Sen’s argument is the idea that advances
in individuals’ material freedoms in certain areas of life promote the development of
greater freedoms in seemingly unrelated domains (Sen 4). In this way, actions that
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enhance a particular group's freedom as an agent simultaneously engender advances in
human freedom generally. This is what Sen refers to as the “effectiveness reason (Sen,
4).” In this way, the effectiveness reason for promoting freedom is linked to the
instrumental role of freedom. Similarly, the evaluative reason for promoting reason,
which holds that “assessment of progress has to be done primarily in terms of whether the
freedoms that people have are enhanced,” is inseparable from the constitutive role of
freedom (Sen 4).
Sen then shifts his focus to five different categories of instrumental freedoms, “
(1)political freedoms, (2) economic facilities, (3) social opportunities, (4) transparency
guarantees and (5) protective security (Sen 10).” While these freedoms are all worthy
ends on their own given the constitutive role, Sen argues that these five freedoms are also
critical in promoting development (Sen 38). To briefly touch on the meanings of these
separate categories, political freedom encompasses concepts such as democracy broadly,
as well as civil rights, lack of censorship, and the ability to dissent (Sen 28). Economic
facilities refers to individuals ability to “utilize economic resources for the purpose of
consumption, or production, or exchange (Sen 39).” Critically, this freedom also
demands that national economic growth is not limited to only a particular class, so
distributive justice is central to the fulfillment of this instrumental freedom (Sen 39).
Social opportunities comprises the institutions within a society that facilitate a flourishing
life, both mentally and physically, such as health care and education to name two formal
institutions (Sen 39). Next, transparency guarantees are meant to protect against
corruption and predatory economic practices through securing “guarantees of disclosure
and lucidity” between individuals (Sen 39-40). Lastly, protective security refers to the
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presence of institutional arrangements that are intended to ensure the survival of the most
vulnerable members of society such as the poor, unemployed, disabled, elderly, as well as
the victims of natural disasters (Sen 40).
While Sen is correct in pointing out that freedom may frequently be correlated
with these factors, there are also cases where the promotion of freedom comes into
conflict with these specific measures (Sen 3). Hypothetically, consider an authoritarian
government where utilizing central planning has caused widespread poverty (just an
example). In this context, deregulation of the labor market could enhance the freedom
citizens enjoy by allowing greater agency for individuals to pursue whatever they define
for themselves as fulfilling work. Additionally, it is possible that deregulation could uplift
the country economically thereby alleviating the unfreedoms that accompany poverty.
However, in the United States, deregulation of the labor market could leave people less
free by eliminating protections/benefits such as minimum wage, health insurance, as well
as parental leave.
It is with this basis that Sen implores us to always remember that freedom is the
proper end of development, and not to get fixated or overly attached to “particular means,
or some specially chosen list of instruments (Sen 3).” That is to say, we should focus on
promoting freedom directly rather than indirectly. We must recognize that the means we
use to achieve this end may vary depending on context. For example, while in some cases
the promotion of free markets may lead to greater overall freedom this does not
necessarily mean that the maintenance of markets absent governmental regulation should
be what we strive for. Free markets are only a worthy aim insofar as they advance the
more important end of promoting individuals’ substantive freedom (Sen 6). With this
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being said, Sen acknowledges that “freedoms are not only the primary ends of
development, they are also among its principal means (Sen 11).” I only use free markets
as an example, the larger point is, in Sen’s eyes, we are only developing if we are
increasing freedom, regardless of the means or institutional arrangements that get us to
that point.
With this background, it is evident that Sen’s assertion that “development requires
the removal of major sources of unfreedom” flows logically from his definitions of
development and freedom (Sen 3). On the most fundamental level, unfreedom can take
the form of existential threats such as hunger, violence, as well as the lack of healthcare,
sanitation, and clean water (Sen 15). These types of unfreedom are not limited to only
poor nations. As Sen highlights, “Even within very rich countries, sometimes the
longevity of substantial groups is no higher than that in much poorer economies of the socalled third world (Sen 15).” Importantly, Sen recognizes that gender is one form of
unfreedom that can also qualify as an existential threat to women’s lives through violence
as well as restriction of substantive freedom (Sen 15).
Beyond these forms, Sen also focuses on the abridgement of political and civil
rights as unfreedom, which he argues can be a major cause of economic insecurity (Sen
16). Sen also includes factors like “systematic social deprivation, neglect of public
facilities as well as intolerance (Sen 3).” However, one factor I feel he fails to adequately
address is unfreedom institutionalized within our interpersonal relationships, like gender
(perhaps this would fall under systematic social deprivation). Regardless of whether Sen
has named every type of unfreedom (which is not a particularly realistic expectation), the
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main takeaway here should be the idea that if an unfreedom exists, then development
requires that it be dismantled.
This brings me to my argument concerning gender and its incompatibility with
Sen’s conception of development. If we understand development as promoting freedom,
then the most developed society would be the one that has achieved freedom to the
highest degree. In order to realize this objective, Sen makes clear that we must dismantle
the sources of unfreedom that stand in the way of development. In the paragraphs that
follow, I intend to demonstrate that gender as I have defined for the purposes of this
thesis constitutes a major source of unfreedom. For this reason, Sen’s framework would
require that we dismantle the aspects of gender that qualify as forms of unfreedom if we
intend on maximizing human development. However, given that these unfreedoms are
exactly what defines gender, the process of development is also a process of
dismantling/abolishing gender. Any move towards development as freedom with respect
to gender erodes the patriarchal construction of gender. Theoretically, if a society was to
fully achieve the end of development, this society would neccessarily be genderless
according to the definition of gender put forward in my first chapter. Therefore, implicit
in Sen’s Development as Freedom is a powerful argument for the dismantling/abolition
of gender.

GENDER AS UNFREEDOM: OPPORTUNITY ASPECT

In establishing gender as a form of unfreedom I want to first examine genders’
relationship to the opportunity aspect of freedom. Sen defines this component as
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individuals “opportunity to achieve outcomes that they value and have reason to value
(Sen 291).” Sen ties this aspect of freedom to both health and safety, as well as economic
outcomes (Sen 17, 291). In the following paragraphs, I will make clear the ways in which
gender is a major source of unfreedom as it relates to Sen’s opportunity aspect.
Specifically, I will focus on the way in which gender’s delegation of unpaid domestic
labor to women stands in the way of women achieving the same economic outcomes as
men. In this way, gender is an obstacle to the realization of the opportunity aspect of
freedom.
As I mentioned before, Oyèrónkẹ Oyèwùmí observes in Visualising the Body, the
fact that gender is a social construction means that there must be variation depending on
context (time and place), given that not every society is constructed identically
(Oyèwùmí 464). However, despite Oyèwùmí’s contention that gender cannot then be
uniform across all societies, I, along with other significant feminist thinkers, still hold
that gender has several central features that vary in degree but are still present across all
patriarchal societies (Oyèwùmí 462-464). As Awa Thiam observes in Feminism and
Revolution, the delegation of domestic duties to women is one of the most prominent
features of gender that cuts across cultures (Thiam 119). Thiam points out that the
delegation of unpaid domestic duty that defines gender within patriarchal societies leaves
women unfree relative to men (Thiam 119). As I have previously mentioned, this idea is
central to much of contemporary feminist theory.
Here, I argue that gender’s inherent delegation of the burden of domesticity to
women limits their ability to achieve the outcomes that they desire relative to men. One
major reason for this is the fact that women’s labor within the household is typically
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uncompensated, yet assumed and enforced. Conversely, the expectation and duty that
men should participate in the formal labor market positions men advantageously to
pursue and achieve whatever ends they define as worthy. Interestingly, the main
contention of Thiam’s paper is the idea that full liberation for colonized people requires
the liberation of women, which in turn requires a “sexual revolution (Thiam 116).” This
effectively mirrors my argument in this chapter that in order to achieve Sen’s definition
of development to the greatest degree, gender must be abolished/dismantled.
First, let us consider the way in which the burden of unpaid domestic labor
inhibits the opportunity aspect of freedom for women. At the most basic level, the
traditionally gendered family’s main assumption is that the wife/mother stays at home
and does domestic labor while the husband/father works in the labor market (Okin 5). On
the most basic level, it is apparent that when the family is ordered in this way women are
isolated from the formalized economy, and are therefore less able to make money. Given
Sen’s recognition that, although wealth cannot properly be an end in itself (having only
instrumental value), it is extremely useful in helping people achieve “freedom to lead the
kind of lives we have reason to value (Sen 14). Logically, it would follow that the
unequal distribution of wealth caused by gender as traditionally constructed leaves
women with diminished means to pursue the opportunities they value relative to men. For
this reason, when the family is structured in this way, women have less freedom in
achieving desired outcomes, which inhibits the opportunity aspect of freedom
Even today as women increasingly participate in wage labor outside of the
household, the assumptions regarding the division of labor within the household implied
by the traditionally gendered family still hold incredible weight. Here, the burden of
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gender’s inherent delegation of domestic duty to women allows less freedom relative to
men in achieving valued outcomes, both professionally and socially/privately. For
example, Susan Moller Okin states that within “households with two full-time working
parents,” the mother often “does, at the very least, twice as much family work as the
father (Okin 22).” Despite the fact that Okin made this assertion over 30 years ago,
analysis of the American Time Usage Survey published by the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics suggests that very little progress has been made (ATUS). In other words, this
component of the patriarchal construction of gender has remained constant. According to
Data from 2015-2019, in families with two full time working parents women spend
around 45 minutes on housework a day compared to 15 minutes for men (ATUS 7a).
Interestingly, the data set is broken down into three categories: both spouses work full
time, mother employed part time and father employed full time and mother not employed
and father employed full time (ATUS 7a). Notably absent is the possibility that the father
works part time or only the mother is employed. If not for gender, these would be equally
likely possibilities.
This unequal distribution of domestic labor within families with two working
parents restricts women’s ability to pursue their own professional goals to the same
extent that men gain, while still having time for necessary leisure. On average, within
families with two parents working full time, men have 3.6 hours of leisure time per day
compared to 2.86 for women (ATUS 7a). This issue is compounded by the fact that the
ordering of the modern workplace assumes that employees are part of a traditionally
gendered family. To tie these two ideas together, not only does the unequal distribution of
domestic labor within the family make it difficult for women to participate in the labor
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market in the same extent as men, but the patriarchal ordering of the workplace ignores
this burden while simultaneously undervaluing women’s work.
Looking first at the way the unequal distribution of domestic labor affects
women’s ability to achieve their desired professional goals, Susan Moller Okin points out
that “employed wives still do by far the greatest proportion of unpaid family work (Okin
5).” This is an obstacle to women’s economic and professional advancement. For
instance, Okin reminds us that women are more likely to sacrifice their professional
commitments in order to fulfill their enforced domestic duties than men (Okin 5). This
contributes to the overall reality that women “advance more slowly than their husbands at
work and thus gain less seniority (Okin 5).” Because the delegation of domestic labor is a
constitutive part of gender, this reality is best understood as a direct consequence of
gender. This observation is supported by Adrienne Martin who states, “meeting
expectations of domesticity reduces women’s ability to pursue, occupy, and succeed in
more highly valued social roles, especially those that directly affect the distribution of
social goods (Martin 12).” Similarly, women, more often than men, tend to sacrifice their
own careers to accommodate the professional opportunities of their husbands as is the
case when families move for new jobs. Considering inextricable connection between
these dynamics and gender, it is clear gender is an impediment to working
mothers/wives’ professional advancement, and therefore inhibits the opportunity aspect
of freedom for women.
Another example of this dynamic is exemplified by the consequences of parental
leave and the unequal distribution of child rearing duties. First of all, it is important to
point out that parental leave in the United States is conceived of in a deeply gendered

84

manner. However, this is not the case to the same degree in Nordic countries with
significant protections for paternity leave such as Finland (Haataja 2009). Beyond the
delegation of domestic duty that I have focused upon at length, the linkage of biological
sex and gender is used to supports the unjust idea that maternity leave is far more
important than paternity leave, even in Nordic countries (Okin 36). For example, Allan
Bloom states that paternity leave is "contrived and somewhat ridiculous," arguing that
women’s biological capacity for breastfeeding justifies the pattern that working mother’s
take time off work to care for newborns rather than fathers alone or both parents (Okin
36). The underlying implication of this idea is that by virtue of biology, women have
distinct normative expectations relative to men. This is the very notion of gender that my
definition aims to reflect.
The expectation that, within a family with two wage earning parents, women will
take maternity leave while men will continue working prevents the equal achievement of
desired professional outcomes between the genders. Let us consider Okin’s example of
top law firms (Okin 126). Women who want to maximize their professional achievement
and make partner must sacrifice having children or risk being placed on the “mommy
track (Okin 126).” This leaves women within these law firms with a choice between
having a family and pursuing their career goals (Okin 126). However, men need not
sacrifice their professional careers to have children. As Okin points out, plenty of high
level male lawyers have children. The difference is, there is no expectation that they will
hurt the firm by taking time off for the birth of a child (Okin 126). Here, we clearly see
the way in which women’s delegated domestic duties stand in the way of the opportunity
to achieve valued outcomes, and thus the opportunity aspect of freedom. Because this
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expectation is inherent to gender (domestic duty justified through biological appeal
linking sex and gender) it is clear that the opportunity aspect of freedom is diminished for
women by virtue of their gender. In order to fully realize the opportunity aspect of
freedom, gender as presently constructed must be dismantled.
As I mentioned in my first chapter, the centrality of the traditional division of
labor within the family to the construction of gender means that even women without
children are still subject to these same assumptions. This is the result of the patriarchal
manner with which the modern workplace is ordered, as well as the individual biases
against women. The modern workplace is ordered in a way that assumes each worker is a
member of a traditionally gendered family. For example, the schedule of the work day
makes it difficult to maintain a home and/or raise children (Okin 155). Okin points to the
“vast discrepancy between normal full-time working hours and children's school hours
and vacations,” as well as travel demands required by many jobs as evidence (Okin 155156). On the surface, this may seem only relevant to working mothers. However, women
without children may still be passed over for job opportunities because employers are
worried that their potential to become a mother will interfere with their work. Critically,
this does not apply to men as gender does not assume that men will prioritize their
domestic responsibilities over work, this is expected only for women. In this way, sexist
employers may see hiring a childless woman as a greater risk than hiring a childless man.
This is one example of the way that the expectations associated with motherhood are
connected to gender generally, not just the experiences of mothers.
Perhaps more importantly, as I mention in my first chapter, because gender is
something that is continually enforced and taught from birth through adulthood, the
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effects of the assumption of the traditionally gendered family are felt before women
choose whether or not to have children. Regardless of whether a woman chooses to
become a parent, the force of gender raises women with the normative assumption that
they should one day become mothers, which shapes how people think. This is
exemplified in the reality that “occupational aspirations and expectations of adolescents
are highly differentiated by sex . . . [and this] differentiation follows the pattern of sexual
segregation which exists in the occupational structure (Okin 141-142)." Tangibly, this
amounts to women being taught from a young age to have more modest professional
ambitions in which they have less confidence as compared to young men (Okin 142).
This largely stems from the fact that gender ascribes motherhood as a more proper life for
women as opposed to professional achievement (Okin 142). Here, it is evident that the
burden of motherhood is very influential in the development of young women who may
never become mothers.
The astounding extent of this gendered assumption is revealed in the
Grandmother hypothesis, which suggests that women have evolved to live longer than
men because of the role of grandmothers in the raising of children (Lambert 2019). Based
on data from colonial Quebec, researchers observed that adult daughters' proximity to
their mothers was correlated with substantially increased family size (Lambert 2019).
Although 400 year data from Canada might seem irrelevant, we must remember that at
the time “about half of a woman's offspring died before age 15. Such harsh conditions led
to a range of reproductive success (Lambert 2019).” For this reason, the utility of
grandmothers’ labor to the success of the family is more apparent in this context than it
would be today. Proponents of this theory believe that the assumption that women, and
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therefore grandmothers, provide uncompensated domestic labor helps explain why
humans are one of the only species where “females live on long past the age of
reproduction (Lambert 2019).” What I want to emphasize here is that the gendered
domestic duty shouldered by women is so pervasive that it may have created an
evolutionary change reflected in all women.
With this in mind, it is clear that the assumptions of the traditionally gendered
family (mainly that women will not take part in wage labor) informs the paths that all
women take to some degree. As a result, one of the most important forces behind the
economic disparities between working men and women is the careers that individuals
choose to pursue (Okin 145). Examples of female-dominated industries include teaching,
nursing, administrative support and service/care work (Okin 144). Okin suggests that
women may choose these fields because they allow for greater flexibility in fulfilling
domestic duties associated with motherhood (Okin 144). However, it goes without saying
that many within these fields are not mothers and chose these professions for other
reasons. In this way, the gendered expectations that accompany motherhood exercise
power during young women’s development that endures whether or not they choose to
have children.
Critically, these fields are underpaid as compared to male dominated professions,
and offer limited prospects of upward mobility (Okin 144). This is another consequence
of the patriarchal ordering of the workplace (Olin Wright). The main takeaway here
should be that all women are subject to the force of the assumptions of the traditionally
gendered family, as these assumptions are inextricably connected to gender broadly. In
this way, as I have demonstrated, gender inhibits women’s ability to realize the outcomes
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they desire compared to men. Additionally, we should question desires that are a
byproduct of the unjust construction of gender. We cannot treat these desires in the same
way that economists treat preferences. We must consider the manner in which our social
arrangements shape these desires in a way that replicates existing forms of unfreedom
and domination.
On the other side of things, Awa Thiam claims that, by virtue of their gender
privilege, men have “access to the world at large, [and] the opportunity to develop his
intellectual and physical faculties in a range of experiences (Thiam 119).” While my
previous few pages have focused on the way in which gender diminishes women’s ability
to achieve valued outcomes economically, I must point out that gender works to men’s
advantage in attaining their economic goals. As Thiam posits, because gender assumes
that men will primarily work outside of the household, men are able to develop skills and
connections that are highly valued economically. Because of this, as Elizabeth Anderson
holds in Unstrapping the Straitjacket of ‘Preference,’ men are more able to develop
“human capital,” thereby increasing their ability to achieve desired outcomes (Anderson
33). As Okin and Anderson both observe, the resulting disparity in earning potential is
further used to legitimate men’s advantageous position thus creating a positive feedback
loop (Anderson 33 and Okin 5). However, it is critical to note that this level of economic
output for men within the traditionally gendered family is only possible through the
unpaid labor that women perform (Anderson 33). Evidently, gender offers men increased
opportunity to achieve their desired outcomes by enforcing the servility of women. As a
result of their gender, men experience the opportunity aspect of freedom more fully than
women.
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In tandem, these statements from Martin, Thiam and Anderson support my
contention that gender leaves women at a disadvantage in achieving desired professional
outcomes relative to men. Both genders certainly have expectations and duties placed
upon them, but these do not function equally. The fact that gender has traditionally
delegated the household as the proper place for women’s labor has isolated women from
the formal economy and civil society generally. As I have demonstrated, it is clear that
the domestic expectations that characterize gender act upon all women to some degree,
not only mothers. These expectations stand in the way of women being able to capitalize
on the same opportunities that men are afforded. Now recall, the definition of the
opportunity aspect of freedom, which requires that individuals be able to “achieve
outcomes that they value and have reason to value,” including but not limited to
economic achievement. If gender stands in the way of women's ability to achieve desired
outcomes compared to men, then evidently gender is incompatible with the full
realization of the opportunity aspect of freedom.

GENDER AND THE PROCESS ASPECT OF FREEDOM

Shifting now to the process aspect of freedom, as I mentioned earlier, the process
aspect of freedom relates to the individual's ability to exercise “freedom of actions and
decisions (Sen 17).” Sen emphasizes the importance of freedom in decision making
specifically in relation to “ participation in political decisions and social choice (Sen
291).” He also asserts that “unfreedom can arise...through inadequate processes (Sen
17).” As I will demonstrate, gender is an impediment to the exercise of free agency in
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decision making for both genders, but particularly for women. Beginning with, political
participation, gender has traditionally left women on the margins of political life.
Historically, women have been explicitly excluded from political participation, and at the
very least consistently underrepresented within governing bodies. As a consequence,
political philosophy has treated politics as the exclusive domain of men. In the social
sphere, gender leaves women with less decision making power within the family, as well
as the community more broadly. Moreover, gender also unjustly dictates what sort of life
is normatively appropriate for an individual to pursue based on the delegation of duties,
privileges and expectations according to gender and their enforcement. In terms of In this
way, gender constitutes unfreedom when considering the process aspect of freedom.
Historically, gender has been tied to political participation with men, specifically
white men, being regarded as the sole beings capable of political thought. In The Struggle
for Reason in Africa, Mogobe B. Ramose asserts that the dehumanizing characterization
of Africans and indigenous people as lacking rationality “is the foundation of racism
(Ramose 3).” Through the active process of the construction of whiteness, the recognition
of seemingly neutral concepts common to all humans, such as rationality, was made
conditional upon phenotypic characteristics as well as heritage (Ramose 3). More
concretely, the linkage of reason and humanity was weaponized against Africans as well
as indiginous people globally in order to justify claims of white superiority (Ramose 1).
The linkage of reason and humanity also effectively implied that anyone who was not
regarded as “rational” was not fully human (Ramose 1).This is what Ramose refers to as
the “struggle for reason (Ramose 1).” The notion that only white men possessed reason
was used to legitimate colonialism and missionary activity as beneficent acts given that
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black and indigenous people supposedly lacked the rationality required for self
determination (Ramose 1). Clearly, the capacity for reason has long been intimately
connected to the right of political participation
Critically, Ramose holds that the “struggle for reason” is rooted in Aristotle’s
statement that “man is a rational creature (Ramose 1).” Aristotle's choice to refer to
“man” as rational had the important implication characterizing women as incapable of
reason (Ramose 1). As Ramose describes the consequences of the struggle of reason for
African’s rights, the notion that rationality is unique to men has also been used to justify
the exclusion of women from political participation (Okin 8). Moreover, Okin states that
Aristotle’s regarded women as “not fundamentally equal to the free men who participate
in political justice, but inferiors whose natural function is to serve those who are more
fully human (Okin 14).” Here, again we see that the characterization of women as lacking
rationality dehumanized women similarly to how the same statement regarding African’s
supported the white supremacist idea that African’s were not fully human. Undoubtedly,
the struggle for reason has led to the exclusion of both black people and women from full
participation in political life.
Recall that a central component of my definition of gender is the idea that
biological sex serves as the basis for normative assumptions and expectations for a
person. Put differently, any assumption that is made based only upon an individuals
perceived biological sex constitutes gender. As I pointed out two paragraphs ago, the
recognition of rationality was made contingent on the presence of certain phenotypic
characteristics. In the case of black people, this was most notably skin color, while for
women sex served as the basis for these unjust judgements. With this in mind, it is clear
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that this characterization of women is not merely a form of sexism. Instead, the idea that
women lack reason is inseparable from the historical, patriarchal construction of gender.
This supports my contention that gender is incompatible with the full realization of the
process aspect of freedom.
Aristotle is not alone in his exclusion of the possibility of women’s participation
in politics. For example, the writings of Saint Augustine position women as equal to men
“in their capacity to share in the divine life,” but hold that women should be controlled by
men and “restricted to the domestic sphere” and thus excluded from political life (Okin
57). Similarly, Saint Thomas Aquinas believed that women, unlike men, did not have the
capacity for reason and should be excluded from politics (Okin 57-58). This articulation
of the struggle for reason was used by Aquinas to justify male domination of women as
being for their own good (Okin 58). Likewise, Rousseau believed that no harm was done
by denying women political participation given his belief that husbands could adequately
represent the family as a whole (Okin 26-27). While the struggle for reason was used to
exclude Africans from political participation, the concept served the same purpose in
relation to women, while simultaneously justifying the hierarchical structure of the
patriarchal family.
Okin highlights the fact that nearly all theories of justice “have assumed that the
"individual" who is the basic subject of the theories is the male head of a patriarchal
household (Okin 14).” For example, this same assumption is made by John Rawls in A
Theory of Justice in stating that those in the original positions are “heads of families
(Okin 92). The importance of this assumption is not simply rhetorical. Instead, adoption
of the value of patriarchal household has directly resulted in women’s marginalization
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from political life. For example, Okin points out that Bradwell v. Illionois prevented
women from practicing law based on the rationale that the patriarchal family, “that was
held to require the dependence of women and their exclusion from civil and political life”
was essential to the United States’ “stability and order (Okin 19).” This is an example of
the “public/domestic dichotomy” that delegates women’s proper sphere of activity to the
home only (Okin 110-111).
With this background, it is clear that the idea that women lack rationality has
been entrenched over time to justify women’s exclusion from the political process. This
is most evident when considering women’s explicit exclusion from voting. Women did
not gain the right to vote in the United States until 1920 with the United Kingdom
following suit eight years later (Infoplease). France and Switzerland, both considered
relatively progressive nations, did not grant women suffrage until 1944 and 1971
respectively (Infoplease). Most recently, women were allowed to vote for the first time in
the United Arab Emirates in 2006 and in Saudi Arabia in 2011 (Infoplease).
However, just because women have the right to vote on paper does not mean that
they are able to participate in the political process equally to men. For example, in
Afghanistan women’s ability to vote is significantly restricted by the requirement that
they obtain a male family member's permission to leave the house (Aspinal). This has not
stopped many brave women from voting and running for office even, when faced with
violent threats from the Taliban as well as protests from religious conservatives
(Aspinal). Similarly, in Pakistan women are frequently “barred from voting by their
husbands and village elders,” again often suffering public scorn and violence as a result
(Aspinal). Additionally, nations like, but not limited to, Uganda and Kenya fail to

94

consider the expectations of household labor that women are subject to which make it
difficult to take the time out to vote (Aspinal).
Beyond these examples, even in more developed nations (under Sen’s definition)
women are unfree when considering political participation and its relation to the process
aspect of freedom. This is exemplified in women’s underrepresentation in elected offices
in most “developed democracies.” At the time of writing this thesis, there are currently
101 women in the United States’ House of Representatives (23.2 %), and 26 in the senate
(26%) (CAWP Rutgers). While this is certainly an improvement from 1989, the year that
Okin’s Justice, Gender and the Family was published, when there were only two female
senators, there is no question that women still do not hold the same political power that
men do. In fact, according to Pew Research Center data, the US is very average in terms
of women’s representation in national legislative bodies (Atske 2020). Globally, 24% of
all national legislative seats are occupied by women (Atske 2020). In fact, only three
nations, Cuba, Rwanda, and Bolivia have at least a proportionate share of women within
their legislatures (Atske 2020). Based on this evidence, it is an empirical fact that
globally women do not hold the same political power as men. Put differently, across the
world, women do not equally participate in the process of political decision making.
Unquestionably then, gender is a form of unfreedom when considered from the process
aspect of freedom.
One of the main reasons for women's underrepresentation in national legislative
bodies is related to the traditionally gendered family. Firstly, as Okin would suggest,
“until there is justice within the family, women will not be able to gain equality in
politics (Okin 4).” Here, once more the assumed domestic burden shouldered by women
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makes it more difficult to run for office than it would be for a man within a traditionally
gendered family. Okin theorizes that if men and women shared equally in domestic
responsibilities then women would likely be more evenly represented in political offices
(Okin 171, 179). This is because often women are forced to choose between having
children and “attaining positions of the greatest social influence” such as a congressional
representative (Okin 171). Because of their gender, men do not face this same
predicament. This perspective is supported by British politician Shirley Williams who
expressed the sentiment that until men bear their fair share of familial responsibilities, the
vast majority of women will be unable to pursue a “job as demanding as politics (Okin
104).”
To anticipate a potential objection, an opponent of my perspective may claim that
whether women are equally represented in government is not an issue as long as women’s
perspectives are accounted for by male representatives. However, as Okin argues men
cannot adequately embody women’s views in politics such that actual representation is
not necessary (Okin 102). As I have previously mentioned regarding Carol Gilligan’s
Jack and Jill example, and as Okin articulates, “the different life experiences of females
and males from the start in fact affect their respective psychologies, modes of thinking,
and patterns of moral development in significant ways (Okin 106). As a result, there is
significant evidence to support the claim that women’s perspectives are unique from
men’s, who are unable to truly put themselves in women’s shoes (Okin 106-107).
Accordingly, Okin holds that women’s underrepresentation in politics prevents the
creation of a “fully human moral or political theory (Okin 107).” Recognizing this, it is
impossible to claim that women can participate fully in the process of political choice
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through voting alone. True realization of the process aspect of freedom for women
requires gender parity within legislative bodies.
Briefly summarizing my argument in this section so far, one critical component of
the process aspect of freedom is the ability to participate in the political process.
However, gender has been constructed in a way that affords men much greater agency
politically. Historically, the concept of “reason” and its limitation to white males
legitimized women’s exclusion from political life, as seen in the Rousseau, Aquinas,
Augustine and Rawls examples. As with the struggle for reason generally, the presence of
reason was tied to physical characteristics, in this case sex. Based on my definition given
in the first chapter, the linkage of sex with rationality makes clear that the phenomenon I
am describing is an example of gender and not sexism. The consequences of this
component of gender are still felt to this day, most notably in women’s
disenfranchisement and underrepresentation within government. As I have shown,
women certainly have less of an ability to make their voices heard through the political
process than men. Given that the process aspect of freedom requires the ability to
participate in the political decision making process, it is clear that women are unfree
relative to men due to their gender with regards to the process aspect of freedom.
Another crucial part of the process aspect of freedom is the ability for people to
exercise free agency in their social/private lives. Here, the process aspect of freedom is
reflected in individuals’ ability to make decisions for themselves within their family and
community and influence others (Sen 5, 110, 286). This is what Sen refers to as “social
choice.” While impediments to the process aspect of freedom may take the forms of laws
that seek to control individuals actions explicitly, free agency is also affected by informal
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institutions, as is the case with gender. Informal institutions have the ability to dictate the
way in which people conceive of their position/role within society, which in turn shapes
individuals actions as a result of the normative force that lies within the collective
enforcement of social constructs like gender. In the following paragraphs I argue that
gender is incompatible with true social choice given the hierarchical structure of the
family. Furthermore, gender leaves women with less influence in the broader community,
even further diminishing the possibility of social choice. On top of this, gender’s inherent
delegation of a particular “proper life” based on sex is incompatible with the free agency
that social choice requires. Accordingly, it is clear that gender stands in the way of the
process aspect of freedom as it relates to social choice.
As prominent feminist thinkers like Susan Moller Okin argue, the traditionally
gendered family is necessarily hierarchical with the father/husband occupying the
dominant position (Okin 19, 134-135). As Okin observes, this hierarchy is intimately
related to the economic advantage that men receive as a result of the gendered division of
labor (Okin 95). For example, Okin points out that fathers/husbands are often able to use
“the fact that he is the wage earner to "pull rank" on or to abuse his wife (Okin 22).” This
example demonstrates the way in which gender leaves women with less decision making
power within the family. In fact, thinkers like Louis de Bonald argued that structural
similarities of the family informed and were crucial to the maintenance of totalitarian
governments (Okin 18-19).
Somewhat similarly, “Rousseau, Hegel, Tocqueville...all defended the hierarchy
of the marital structure while spurning such a degree of hierarchy in institutions and
practices outside the household (Okin 19).” With this in mind, it is indisputable that the
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traditionally gendered family leaves women with significantly less agency than the male
head of household. So much less agency, in fact, that the most accurate comparison with
another institution is with a totalitarian government. Importantly, these characterizations
of the traditionally gendered family were articulated by proponents of this institution, not
radicals calling for its abolition. If the family is a dictatorship with the father at the head,
then women have less social choice by virtue of their gender. In this case, when I say
social choice I am referring to the capacity for decision making within the family.
Consequently, it is evident that gender as traditionally constructed cannot exist if we
desire to realize the full extent of the process aspect of freedom for all people.
As Adrienne Martin articulates even more strongly in Against Mother's Day and
Employee Appreciation Day, domesticity “represents a form of slavery,” which entails
prioritizing familial duties over self interest (Martin 2, 4). Martin points out that
oftentimes mothers’ actions in service of their family are motivated by fear and prevent
mothers from attaining “more highly valued social roles (Martin 6,7,12).” We again see
that gender diminishes women’s free agency and social choice. First of all, the
enforcement of the burden of domesticity within the family often prevents women from
acting in their own self interest. One important example of this is the fact that women
often do not have the same ability to enjoy leisure time as their male partners (Okin 95).
Additionally, the enforcement of domesticity can hinder mothers ability to pursue
meaningful commitments outside of the home (Martin 14). This can prevent women from
achieving highly valued and prestigious opportunities that would allow for greater
influence within the family and community more broadly. Here, the enforcement of the
gendered division of labor diminishes women’s agency within the family, and therefore
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their ability to pursue and define their desires, as well as exercise influence over their
communities, both of which are central to the process aspect of freedom and social
choice.
Perhaps most importantly, definitionally gender is diametrically opposed to the
idea of free agency in social choice. Recall my definition of gender given in chapter one.
I state that gender delegates duties, privileges, and expectations and ascribes onto every
individual a binary conception of what constitutes a proper life. Moreover, I point out that
deviations from gendered expectations carries very real consequences for those who
choose to challenge these established conventions. For example, as I have discussed at
length, gender delegates the duty of domesticity to women based on sex assigned at birth.
This social role is not freely chosen, it is assigned. Additionally, this ascription of what
constitutes as “proper life” may frequently stand in the way of women’s ability to pursue
and define their desires. As Martin reminds us, “deviations from these expectations are
seen as, at best, surprising and, at worst, a source of shame and opprobrium (Martin 4).”
To sum up these two related ideas, gender from birth defines what actions, behaviors and
desires are appropriate for a person based on a physical characteristic. Here, the
individual has no choice but to comply or else face social repercussions.
The process aspect of freedom requires that each individual have the ability to
exercise freedom in their actions and decisions (Sen 17). However, this is impossible
living under an institution that delegates duties and expectations on an arbitrary basis to
which individuals are expected to conform their lives or face significant consequences.
We do not get to freely choose our gender and its connected roles. Additionally, simply
because someone can break a rule does not mean that the enforcement of that rule does
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not constitute a violation of the individuals freedom to choose. Plainly, whatever stands
in the way of people's ability to freely make choices for themselves is an obstacle to the
full exercise of the process aspect of freedom. With this in mind, gender clearly
constitutes a significant unfreedom in this respect alone.
To sum up my argument put forward in this subsection, gender prevents true
social choice and therefore the process aspect of freedom. The hierarchical structure of
the patriarchal family implied by gender is frequently compared to a dictatorship. If one
accepts, as I believe Sen would, that social choice cannot exist under dictatorship then it
is clear that the process aspect of freedom cannot be realized within the traditionally
gendered family. Others compare the structure of the traditionally gendered family to
slavery. As is the case with slavery, uncompensated labor and the fear of violence prevent
the existence of freedom. Moreover, the concept of gender as I have defined it is entirely
incompatible with social choice, as the duties and expectations implied are delegated
along a totally arbitrary basis and actively enforced. Given that gender is incompatible
with social choice, it is apparent that gender constitutes a significant form of unfreedom
in that it violates the process aspect.

EVALUATIVE AND EFFECTIVENESS REASONS

As I established in the past two sections, gender qualifies as a form of unfreedom
when considered from both the prospect and opportunity aspects of freedom. With this in
mind, I want to turn to the evaluative and effectiveness reasons to prioritize freedom in
development. Briefly looking first at the evaluative reason, Sen states that “assessment of
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progress has to be done primarily in terms of whether the freedoms that people have are
enhanced (Sen 4). This point is intimately connected to the constitutive role of freedom,
which holds that freedom is the “primary end” of development given the fact that
increased freedom improves the lives of all people (Sen 36). As I mentioned in my
reconstruction of Sen’s argument, the constitutive role of freedom relates to the removal
of various forms of unfreedom. With this in mind, the evaluative reason is simply based
on Sen’s definition of development. Sen defines development as the process of increasing
the degree of “real freedom” that individuals enjoy within a particular society. The
evaluative reason merely states that prioritizing the expansion of freedom is necessary
because it is required by the definition of development.
To connect this to gender, given that I have established gender as a form of
unfreedom, the evaluative reason would imply that development is inseparable from the
process of dismantling/abolishing gender. Critically, this statement rests upon the idea
that if gender was no longer a form of unfreedom, then it would no longer exist as we
know it. For example, if gender is no longer tied to the delegation of domestic duty, then
we have significantly moved towards genderlessness. If all such ascriptions of social
roles are dismantled, then we have achieved genderlessness. With this being said,
considering the constitutive role of freedom, it is clear that because gender stands in the
way of individuals’ agency in pursuing, achieving and defining their goals, then
dismantling gender constitutes the promotion of freedom and therefore development. In
this context, the evaluative reason holds that progress requires that gender must be
dismantled in order to achieve development to the highest degree. Because unfreedom is
inextricably linked to gender, the removal of these unfreedoms that development
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necessitates is to move towards dismantling/abolishing gender. To reiterate, Sen’s
evaluative reason makes clear that if full development is to be realized a complete
deconstruction of gender must occur.
Turning now to the effectiveness reason, Sen’s observation that the effects of
increasing women’s agency is not limited to improvements for only women, but society
as a whole, confirms that gender functions like all other forms of unfreedom (Sen 191).
As Sen argues, empowering women economically and through education does not only
address the specific challenges faced by women. Instead, giving women increased agency
also uplifts others as exemplified by decreased child mortality. This example of the
positive consequences of the promotion of women’s agency on non-women illuminates
Sen’s “effectiveness reason,” which has the implication of revealing the way in which
gender’s negative effects are not limited to only women.
Amartya Sen mainly chooses to focus on two ways by which women’s capacity as
decision making agents is increased. Specifically, through increased participation in the
formalized economy, and through education. Critically, economic and educational
empowerment do not simply promote the wellbeing of women, but allow for women to
better advocate for, and pursue what they identify as being in their interest (Sen 189-190).
This is what Sen refers to as the “agency aspect of women’s movements” that allows
women to be “the dynamic promoters of social transformations that can alter the lives of
both women and men (Sen 189-190).” Sen makes clear that increasing agency amounts
to increasing “decisional power,” which is central to the process aspect of freedom (Sen
195, 291).”
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As Sen points out, within the family, part of the reason for the asymmetric agency
between men and women is the economic power that men tend to possess as the
“breadwinner (Sen 194).” On the other hand, the traditionally gendered family typically
assigns domestic labor duties to women that reduce their ability to participate in the
formalized economy (Sen 194). Critically, the ability to earn money and support the
family financially elevates women’s relative position within the family (Sen 194). In this
way, the freedom to seek employment outside of the household increases women’s
agency which, in turn, “seems to help to foster freedom in other [areas of life] (Sen
194).”
Similarly, Sen points out that education is a powerful channel through which
women’s agency can be elevated. Education is central to promoting freedom in “social
opportunities,” which contributes to “the individual's substantive freedom to live better
(Sen 39).” Looking specifically at illiteracy, the inability to read diminishes individuals
ability to participate fully in the economy, as well as the political process (Sen 39).
Specifically, individuals who cannot read are unable to work in jobs that “require
production according to specification or demand strict quality control (Sen 39).”
Likewise, illiteracy leaves individuals unable to access the information contained in
newspapers, and the internet, or advocate for their interests through writing (Sen 39). In
terms of the gendered effects of illiteracy, the inability to read or write reinforces
relationships of dependence and asymmetric agency between men and women.
Of course, increased agency allows for women to better advocate on their
own behalf, however, it is crucial to recognize that promoting women’s agency also leads
to the development of greater freedoms for all. The promotion of women’s agency
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through education and economic empowerment encourages the development of what Sen
calls “protective security” for children, not only women (Sen 40). Protective security
encompasses the “freedom to survive (Sen 52).” As Sen states, “There is considerable
evidence that women's education and literacy tend to reduce the mortality rates of
children (Sen 195).” Sen argues that increasing agency for women within the family
results in greater emphasis being placed on the wellbeing of children (Sen 195). In
particular, increasing women’s agency through literacy seems to be the most significant
force in promoting child survival as opposed to “male literacy or general poverty
reduction (Sen 197-198).” Though, the relationship is not so clear with regards to
economic participation, given the fact that women may not be able to actually gain better
child care for their children when faced with the “double burden” or domestic and
economic labor (Sen 196). Nevertheless, what this example shows us is that the
promotion of women’s free agency (in this case primarily through education) contributes
to the development of freedom for all people, not only women. Evidently, the
abolition/dismantling of gender is not only a women’s issue, but uplifts all humans.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this chapter focused on Amartya Sen’s vision of human
development based on freedom, which consists of an “opportunity” and “process” aspect.
As I argue, the economically vulnerable position of women, and their exclusion from
political life are constitutively tied to gender and inhibit the “opportunity” and “process”
aspect of freedom respectively. Because Sen asserts that development requires the
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elimination of forms of unfreedom, and given that gender constitutes a form of
unfreedom, I established that implicit in Sen’s theory is an argument for gender
abolition. We have significant reason to believe that gender is a form of unfreedom
because it acts in very much the same way as other forms of unfreedom, as evidenced by
the fact that the promotion of women’s agency uplifts those around them. This is an
example of the effectiveness reason for promoting freedom. If gender no longer
consituted a form of unfreedom, this would requires the dissolution of the constitutive
elements of gender including the linkage of biological sex and gender, as well as the
attached set of duties, priveleges and expectations.
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CHAPTER 5: How Gender Harms Men

Up to this point, my analysis has focused almost exclusively on the ways in which
gender harms women. It is undeniable that women are relatively worse off under
patriarchy than men. However, this does not mean that men are not also harmed by
gender. Even from the perspective of men, who are generally privileged by gender,
abolition would still improve the human condition. Flatly, gender does not serve men or
women’s interest. In the following pages, I explore the negative effects that the
patriarchal construction manhood has on men themselves. I begin by arguing that gender
harms men from an epistemic perspective. Here, I draw on the work of Briana Toole on
standpoint epistemology to advance the argument that men’s social position in patriarchal
society hinders their ability to come to understand some core realities of human relations.
Moreover, as Robin Dembroff's work demonstrates, many men suffer gender oppression
based on the presence of other marginalized identities that exclude them from the true
dominant category of “real men.” In this way, many men actually suffer gender based
oppression, which undermines the idea of unqualified male privilege. Additionally, as I
will make clear through my discussion of these two different frameworks, these harms
inevitably take an emotional and physical toll on men to the detriment of their emotional
and bodily health.
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Epistemic Harm

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that focuses on the “study of the nature,
origin, and limits of human knowledge (Britannica).” As Briana Toole points out, in a
normative sense epistemology aims to bring humans closer to truth (Toole 2019, 598). In
this context, epistemic harm can be defined as the “subver[sion]” of the end of
knowledge acquisition (Toole 2019, 598). In other words, anything that keeps humans
from advancing their understanding of the nature of the world, or their place in it relative
to others, constitutes an undesirable harm from an epistemic perspective. As I will
explore in this section, gender constitutes an epistemic harm, not only for women but also
for men.
Standpoint epistemology holds that social positionality and identity are of central
importance to understanding the way that agents come to know the world (Toole 2020,
1). Interestingly, standpoint epistemology has historically proceeded from a Marxist
focus on the “proletarian standpoint,” and has until recently, in recognition of the work of
philosophers like Patricia Hill Collins, eschewed critical analysis of gender in favor of
power differential more generally (Toole 2020 1-2). One key component of standpoint
epistemology is the idea that identity-based “nonepistemic features” affect “what an
epistemic agent is in a position to know (Toole 2019, 598-599).” This is what is known as
the “situated knowledge thesis (Toole 2019, 599). ” However, we are left with the
question: what exactly is a (non)epistemic feature?
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As Toole explains, concepts such as “evidence, justification, reliability” are
epistemic features in the sense that they give credence to the truthfulness of a belief
(Toole 2019, 600). Toole argues that these features can be understood as “accessible” to
any epistemic agent; a position which is attributable to the “aperspectival” view of
epistemology (Toole 2020, 4). Nonepistemic features, on the other hand, would seem to
be an immeasurably larger category. Although I suppose everything from preferences to
physical descriptors could be considered a nonepistemic social fact, what is of the
greatest importance to standpoint epistemology in this context is social positionality and
identity (Toole 2019, 599). Here, to reiterate, the situated knowledge thesis advances the
idea that some knowledge is only available to certain epistemic agents by virtue of their
social position within society (Toole 2019, 599).
This concept is reflected in the closely related concept of “epistemic privilege,”
which holds that members of oppressed groups gain knowledge as a result of their social
position (Toole 2019, 600). In the case of epistemic privilege, members of the dominant
group may fail to develop the insights into their “social situatedness,” which is a
necessity for the powerless (Toole 2019, 600). In contrast to epistemic features, the
knowledge acquired as a result of nonepistemic features is not easily accessible (Toole
2020, 4). Opponents of this view may hold that these features are irrelevant to what
someone can come to know. After all, the aperspectival view would suggest that provided
evidence any epistemic agent can come to know what another knows (Toole 2020, 4).
However, the concept of “achievement” stands in stark opposition to this position. The
thesis of “achievement” holds that some forms of knowledge are produced only through
lived experience that is dependent on social identity coupled with diligent
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“consciousness-raising (Toole 2019, 600).” Thus far, the main takeaway of this section
should be that social positionality affects the epistemic condition of individuals based on
their social position. Going forward, I will focus specifically on gender as a nonepistemic
feature that deeply shapes the epistemic condition of virtually all humans for the worse.
Professor Toole’s feminist analysis of epistemic oppression rightly centers the
experiences of women. Here, Toole’s analysis offers us deep insights into the way in
which the continuous enforcement of gender specifically is connected to knowing. Toole
states that “feminist-material accounts argue for the emergence of a distinctly feminist
standpoint (Toole 2019, 601).” Here, I wish to begin by pointing out that this statement
supports my previous assertion that gender creates distinct perspectives in men and
women from childhood as evidenced in the Jack and Jill example I discussed in my
chapter on Marx. Importantly, Toole’s analysis goes beyond a narrow focus on only
reproductive labor to incorporate more modern, intersectional issues (Toole 2019, 602).
For example, Toole focuses on “emotional and cognitive labor” that is often forced upon
women, particularly women of color, within the family and within the modern workplace
(Toole 2019, 602). This type of labor can include disproportionate, uncompensated
mentorship or an assumed duty to take the lead in diversity training (Toole 603).
Critically, Toole holds that, as with the more traditional assumptions that characterize the
feminist-material account, these gendered and racialized forms of uncompensated labor
are also translated into epistemic difference (Toole 2019, 604).
However, Toole does not limit the scope of her analysis to labor only. Instead, the
social position of agents generally, detached from labor, is also relevant to standpoint
epistemology (Toole 2019, 604). Citing Gaile Pohlhaus, Toole tells us that the oppressed
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must “develop a body of conceptual resources so as to understand the experiences they
have in virtue of their marginalization (Toole 2019, 604).” The development of these
“conceptual resources” is exactly what enables marginalized groups to develop
“epistemic privilege” through achievement. In this case, achievement and the
development of new conceptual resources occurs “when our conceptual resources are
inadequate” to understand a particular experience or set of experiences “we reform,
“revise” and create new resources (Toole 2019, 604). Accordingly, the presence and
level of development of various conceptual resources are central to the epistemic
condition of different actors. By gaining conceptual resources through which to
understand the world, marginalized groups acquire knowledge that is not readily
accessible to those within the dominant group.
With this in mind, it is apparent that women have achieved conceptual resources
that men generally have not needed to in order to survive and make sense of their
experiences in a patriarchal society. However, as Toole points out, and as I have
mentioned in the past, women have been excluded from the intellectual production or
“meaning generation” that shapes the material conditions of our world (Toole 2019, 604605). For example, the criminal justice system has long failed to not only care about
issues of sexual violence but even generate the necessary language and terminology to
conceptualize the lived experiences of women (Toole 2019, 605). This is because men, as
“dominantly situated knowers” have not needed to develop the conceptual resources to
address the pervasive gender-based violence carried out against women (Toole 2019,
606). As a consequence, men are unable to perceive the issues that affect women by
virtue of their oppressed social position within the patriarchy. Even if well-intentioned,
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an exclusively male perspective cannot hope to adequately represent women’s interests
fully. Clearly, patriarchal control of major institutions like the legal system codifies
men’s epistemological blind spots into the law in a way that harms women. This is one
example of what thinkers like Toole and Kristie Dotson would call epistemic oppression
(Toole 2019, 608).
With this background, I now want to transition to thinking about men’s epistemic
position within patriarchy. Firstly, I should acknowledge that although I argue that gender
is a source of epistemic harm for men, this does not mean that men are not the
beneficiaries of patriarchy. As Professor Toole addresses at length in From Standpoint
Epistemology to Epistemic Oppression, women still suffer significant epistemic
oppression, even if they are epistemically privileged relative to men in one sense.
Nevertheless, as I will demonstrate, gender still epistemically harms men insofar as we
accept epistemology and truth as normative ends worth striving for. In other words, if we
believe that humans should value and pursue truth and knowledge, then we must
recognize that gender subverts these ends for both men and women. In this way, gender is
definitionally an epistemic harm when considered from the perspective of either men or
women. Furthermore, even though gender constitutes an epistemic harm in and of itself,
this is inevitably translated into more concrete emotional and physiological issues.
The existence of gender creates epistemic harm for men as, by virtue of their
dominant position, men fail to fully understand the true nature of social relations under
patriarchy in the same way that women must. This amounts to a fundamental ignorance
of certain truths of human existence and social relation. As I have covered, the situated
knowledge thesis holds that individuals’ social position influences the knowledge that
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they have access to. On the one hand, women’s social position enables them to gain
insights that men may never have. However, the reverse is equally true. Men’s social
position stands in the way of the acquisition of knowledge.
Here, I want to pause for a moment to reflect on some specific features and
consequences of men’s dominant social position within patriarchy. First of all, gender
generally serves the interests of men in a way that it does not for women. As I will
discuss, there are plenty of reasons for men to be dissatisfied or object to our assigned
gender roles, but undoubtedly our assigned social roles offer more freedom, agency, and
opportunity compared to women. In this way, I argue it should be unsurprising to any
observer if men fail to question the legitimacy of gender itself in the same way that
women do. Flatly, because gender generally advantages men it would make sense that
there is less incentive to question the concept at all.
However, gender is unquestionably one of the main social constructions that
shapes human interaction. Nevertheless, in my experiences men have been far less likely
to have considered opinions on gender compared to women, and are more likely to put
forward essentialist arguments claiming there is a fundamental biological difference
between men and women that legitimizes many parts of gender. This is certainly not to
say that no men question gender (or that all women do). Increasingly, particularly from
what I have seen on college campuses, many men are really putting in the time and effort
to examine some of the fundamental tenets of masculinity that hurt men themselves as
well as society more broadly. Still, it is much easier for men to dismiss the impact of
gender and leave this immensely powerful concept unexamined and unquestioned given
their position as a dominant knower (Toole 2019, 606, 610).
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Since many men fail to interrogate this crucial social construction that dictates so
much of our lives, it seems apparent that the unconcerned man that makes little effort to
learn more about these issues is left epistemically disadvantaged. Thus, gender leaves
many men with a very inadequate and incomplete picture of human social relations, the
world, and their position in it. This is very similar to the way in which people who claim
to “not see race” remain deeply ignorant to one of the most potent concepts structuring
social relations in our country. Fundamentally, failing to question and reflect upon the
legitimacy of gender leaves individuals in an epistemically harmful position. Because of
their social positionality, in this case gender and specifically maleness, men are not
forced to question gender in the same way as women. Therefore, gender harms men from
an epistemic perspective by obscuring realities that are accessible to individuals with a
different social identity.
Transitioning, to return to the issue of sexual violence against women that I
touched on in my reconstruction of Toole’s argument, I hold that men’s social position
can lead to profound naivete with regards to human nature. One place where this is
incredibly evident, in my personal experience, is on college campuses. A lot of men, by
virtue of their dominant social position in patriarchal society, have not ever had to be
concerned about, or subject to, violence, or had to really consider the idea of evil. This is
even more apparent when we consider the privileged background that many students
come from on-campus. However, the same is not true for even the most economically
privileged women on campus. Tragically, according to a 2018 survey of students across
the Claremont Colleges, 15% of participants (nearly 1 in 6) have reported being sexually
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assaulted during their time on campus (Empower Center). Clearly, sexual assault is a
pervasive issue on all college campuses including Claremont Mckenna.
Personally, one of the most shocking realizations of college for me was figuring
out how many of these perpetrators appear to be normal, upstanding members of our
community. One major reason this was shocking to me was my male privilege. As a man,
I have never needed to consider my safety on campus. As a result, it took me a while to
recognize the true scope of this issue. Importantly, while a lot of men on campus do
recognize this reality, I believe many also fail to consider this violently gendered aspect
of the college experience. Here, men’s blindness to the plight of women leads to a
fundamental misunderstanding about a fact of human nature in a way that contributes to
the maintenance of rape culture. Men, particularly privileged men, have not had to learn
the lesson that even the most unassuming people are capable of evil actions. In this way,
many men are incredibly ignorant to not only the reality of violence that over half of our
peers face on campus on a daily basis, but are also incredibly naive to the potential for
evil that lies within every person. Men, by virtue of their social position, have not had to
learn this grim reality in the same way that women have. This amounts to a fundamental
misunderstanding of the nature of the world and humanity, or in other words, an
epistemic harm.
To focus on the material issues posed by failing to critically evaluate gender,
many men fail to identify, and subsequently challenge, a lot of the most destructive
aspects of masculinity. In the end, this epistemic failing hurts men both emotionally and
physiologically. As Barbara Eirenreich describes in The Hearts of Men: American
Dreams and the Flight from Commitment, as early as the 1950’s cardiologists were
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beginning to realize that masculinity presented a serious health risk for men (Eirenreich,
70). Within the traditionally gendered family, men generally assume the role of the
breadwinner, providing for the family economically. This unchosen social role carries an
enormous amount of stress, which scientists were increasingly realizing was a major
contributing factor in coronary disease that disproportionately killed men (Eirenreich
74).”
During this same period, women increasingly engaged in wage labor within the
formalized economy, but did not suffer increased mortality from heart disease (Eirenreich
73-74). Additionally, just because men do more work outside the household in the
traditionally gendered family, it does not follow that women do less work overall
(Eirenreich 74). Moreover, this is not to say that women do not experience stress as a
result of their gendered social position, but rather “that there is a special, lethal kind of
stress associated with the breadwinner's role” that has widely been recognized by the
medical community (Eirenreich 78). In tandem, these three realities suggest that the
causation of heart disease was not work or stress generally, but instead the specific
stresses associated with the gendered delegation of certain crushing responsibilities to
men (Eirenreich 74, 79).
Critically, even recognition of the gendered prescriptions of masculinity can be
“enough to make many men feel tense and anxious at all times (Eirenreich 77).” In this
way, it is not enough for men to attempt to limit their stress by making minute lifestyle
changes, such as eating healthier or meditating. These insignificant changes would not
substantively challenge men’s assigned gender role. Instead, what is necessary from a
health perspective is for men to rebel against their assigned social role, and therefore
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gender itself. While I have suggested that men often fail to critically interrogate gender
given their dominant position within patriarchy, I must point out that many men actually
do precisely this as Eirenreich describes of the beatniks. It is with this background that
Eirenreich describes “male deviants,” like the beatniks, as rebeling not only against their
unchosen, gendered social roles, but also against a system that presents a profound threat
to their physiological wellbeing (Eirenreich 80).”
To relate this discussion back to standpoint epistemology and the situated
knowledge thesis, men’s tendency to leave their ascribed social roles unchallenged is a
direct consequence of the epistemic harm inherent in gender. This is then translated into
negative health outcomes in a way that can only be remedied by deconstructing gender
itself, which in turn requires attention to gender’s epistemic characteristics. In this way,
the epistemic harms associated with masculinity quickly become physiological harms.
Gender has assigned to men a social role that is bad for their health. This reality goes
beyond Eirenreich’s example of coronary heart disease. For example, given that violence
is central to our patriarchal construction of gender, it is unsurprising that so many men
die violent deaths.
As a result of men’s dominant position within patriarchy, many men fail to
develop a precise understanding of gender and its social components and instead focus
only on essential biological characteristics. Consequently, men are relatively unequipped
to make sense of the disastrous effects that gender has on their mental and physical
wellbeing. Here, the epistemic harm’s of gender prevent men from being able to respond
in the right way to the deadly effect of unchosen gender roles. With this in mind, we see
clearly that it is critical that men begin to challenge their gender roles, which will lead to
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positive epistemic changes. For example, if men challenge the assumptions of the
traditionally gendered family, then they will likely uncover some crucial truths regarding
the scope and function of patriarchy. Challenging these norms, and even the process of
becoming more aware of gender's true nature, are concrete steps towards abolition (and
therefore constitute acts of abolition) that will improve the mental and physical health of
men.

PATRIARCHY BENEFITS “REAL MEN,” NOT ALL MEN

Shifting away from epistemic harms, in this section I draw upon Robin
Dembroff’s Putting Real Men on Top to advance the broader claim that men can also be
oppressed by virtue of their gender. Dembroff begins her discussion by showing how the
construction of gender varies across time and place, as I have noted in many different
spots, in an intersectional way (Debroff 2). That is to say that what it means to be a
heterosexual white man is distinct from being a gay black man in a way that cannot be
accounted for by simply looking at these intersecting identities in isolation.
Dembroff argues that the “binary view of patriarchy” is fundamentally flawed
(Dembroff 2). Under the binary view, patriarchy exclusively benefits all men and harms
all women (Dembroff 2). However, as Dembroff observes, this notion is plainly false
when we consider the fact that, for example, black men have often been the “targets,
rather than beneficiaries, of patriarchy (Dembroff 2).” Dembroff then posits that the idea
that men always benefit from patriarchy in a binary manner represents an essentialist
notion within intersectionality and post structuralist philosophy, both of which claim to
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be anti essentialist (Dembroff 2). In this way, Dembroff is critiquing the concept of
“unqualified male privilege” by suggesting that the “bearing physical markers of
maleness does not, of itself, make a person or group unqualified recipients of so-called
‘male privilege’, nor does it make them immune from gender oppression. (Dembroff 2).”
This perspective shines clearly through in Dembroffs analysis of two quotes from
Marilyn Frye and MacKinnon. On the one hand, Frye claims that “men are not oppressed
as men” and that being male is something that a man will always “have going for him
(Dembroff 3).” Similarly, MacKinnon makes a slightly different but closely related claim
that men generally speaking have not been subjected to patriarchal violence, although she
does acknowledge that some subcategories of men have (Dembroff 3). Importantly, this
privileges a particular version of man as the default, generic form, an important
assumption that I will cover in the following paragraph. However, to restate Dembroff’s
position, they maintain that thinking of gender oppression in purely binary terms is
reductionist in that it ignores “the fact that many marginalized men also are targets of
systemic gender injustice under patriarchy (Dembroff 4).” Furthermore, a binary view of
gender oppression fails to give sufficient attention to the intersection of gender with
“features such as race, class, sexuality, and disability (Dembroff 4).” Consequently,
thinking about gender oppression through this essentialist lens obscures “the substantial
impact that these features have on the experiences and social positions of various men
and women (Dembroff 4).”
This raises the question: who exactly are the beneficiaries of patriarchy? With this
background, Dembroff gives us an alternate framework that helps elucidate the
distribution of gender-based oppression considering that careful analysis reveals that this
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type of oppression does not actually occur cleanly along gender lines. More specifically,
“real men” function to delineate between the beneficiaries and victims of patriarchy
(Dembroff 13). Offering a specific definition of “real men,” Dembroff asserts that real
men are those the men “who primarily benefit from dominant ideals of manhood, and the
systemic subordination of women and marginalized men (Dembroff 4).” Dembroff
reminds us that because gender is a social construction, the category of “real men” is
dynamic and varies temporally (Dembroff 5). In theory, Dembroff acknowledges that this
means that currently marginalized men could become “real men (Dembroff 5).” Given
the variability of this term, Dembroff declines to attempt to offer a concrete definition of
“real men,” but offers guidance by suggesting that we evaluate “which features, in a
given place and time, result in persistent and systemic gender-based injustice (Dembroff
5).”
Those who are not considered to be “real men” are marginalized and face genderbased oppression. With this in mind, it is clear that these marginalized men are also
victims of the way that patriarchy functions. Here, Dembroff accounts for three different
ways in which men who are excluded from the category of “real men” are disadvantaged
because of their gender identity. Specifically, victims of gender oppression, including
marginalized men, find themselves subject to “double standards” in “double binds” and
are forced to “double down (Dembroff 5).”
Perhaps the most easily recognizable of these three concepts, double standards in
Dembroffs view refers to the way in which gendered assumptions, duties and
expectations are applied “inconsistently, in a way that censures marginalized men and
excuses “real men” for the same behavior (Dembroff 5).” For example, violence is
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intimately connected to the patriarchal conception of masculinity. From childhood, young
boys are frequently encouraged to assert their masculinity through physical domination.
This component of masculinity is also readily apparent in the media that we consume.
However, as Dembroff points out, this normative conception of masculinity is a double
standard. While violence is “excused or encouraged as proof of manhood” for white men,
Black men are judged by a very different standard (Dembroff 29). In contrast, violence
commited by black men has been used to justify oppression in the form of mass
incarceration, lynching, and police brutality (Dembroff 29). In this way, men excluded
from the category of “real men” face gender based oppression through the imposition of
double standards.
Relatedly, double binds are scenarios in which any action an individual takes will
be met with social sanctions (Dembroff 5). In double binds, no matter what choice
someone makes they will be faced with either “penalty, censure or deprivation (Dembroff
5)”. To put it simply, double binds leave people in positions of “damned if you do,
damned if you don’t (Dembroff 31).” Critically, in the case of double binds any action
taken will reinforce oppressive social norms (Dembroff 31). In the case of gender based
oppression of those excluded from the category of “real men,” one example of a double
bind is found in the social policing of gay men’s affection. Here, there is a social norm
that gay relationships are improper and should be kept behind closed doors. Gay men can
either choose to comply with this standard that is not applied to heterosexual
relationships thereby reinforcing the strength of the norm, or actively rebel against the
norm and face social sanctions often in the form of violence (Dembroff 32).

121

Lastly, Dembroff defines “doubling down” as “the use of violence to punish men
who are perceived as violating or otherwise threatening the prevailing ideals of manhood
(Dembroff 5).” To use the above example, gay men are often subjected to violence given
heterosexuality’s connection to patriarchal manhood. Similarly, this violent form of
gender based oppression is also externalized onto transgender men. As is the case with
gender broadly, the boundaries of “manhood” are enforced with violence to the detriment
of those excluded from the category of “real men.” Clearly, in these cases, men can face
gender based oppression for their failure to conform with the traditional notion of what it
means to be a man.
Importantly, Dembroff makes clear that they have no intention of establishing a
definite hierarchy of oppression (Dembroff 7). Instead, their intention is to demonstrate
that patriarchy situates a small group of “real men” in the dominant position (Dembroff
36-37). Those excluded from the category of “real men” including but not limited to
black, gay and transgender men, as well as women, all face gender based oppression. In
this way, Dembroff challenges the idea of “unqualified male privilege” by showing that
women are not the only victims of patriarchy (Dembroff 2). With this perspective, it is
clear that gender abolition will also benefit men along with women.
While most of Dembroff’s analysis focuses on the ways in which marginalized
men face gender oppression, they also readily acknowledge that even those within the
category of “real men” may be harmed by gender (Dembroff 7). As Dembroff points out,
just because “real men” occupy a “dominant” social position does not mean that their
unchosen social role is conducive to a happy or fulfilling life (Dembroff 7). Dembroff
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reminds us that “even (or especially) the most gender conforming men hugely suffer
psychologically under patriarchy (Dembroff 8).”

CONCLUSION

In sum, while we often think of gender oppression in a simplistic, binary manner
(benefiting all men and harming all women) the reality is much more nuanced. Although
men are certainly advantaged by virtue of their gender relative to women in patriarchal
society, this does not mean that gender actually benefits men in absolute terms. As I have
shown this chapter, gender disadvantages men from an epistemic perspective. Given
men’s dominant position within patriarchal society, men do readily develop some of the
more complex understandings of social relationships that women must develop as a result
of gender based oppression. This epistemic harm is evident in even the most well
intentioned men’s lack of awareness regarding issues such as sexual violence. One
consequence in these gaps in knowledge is that men develop with a flawed understanding
of human nature. This includes a general lack of awareness of gender itself, which
enables passive acceptance of sometimes fatal gender roles. Moreover, as Dembroff
demonstrates in Putting Real Men on Top many men are, in fact, subject to gender based
oppression. In reality, only a narrow segment of men fit within the category of “real
men,” which has historically excluded men of color, gay men and transgender men.
Clearly, gender is not even defensible from the perspective of those who it should
theoretically advantage. Even from the perspective of a purely self interested man, gender
abolition would improve the human condition.
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CHAPTER 6: Abolition in practice

Recall that in my previous chapter on gender abolition I argued that there were two
principal avenues to abolition. Specifically, I argued that it is possible to move towards
genderlessness by either eroding the delegative aspect of gender, or it’s linkage to
biological sex. This two pronged approach offers a natural framework for this chapter.
Here, I must point out that I do not intend on offering a comprehensive account that's full
realization would result in the total abolition of gender. Rather, this chapter seeks to
advance a few concrete examples of what gender abolition looks like in practice. In the
first section of this chapter I examine some of the forms of gender that we find most
natural and question the least. Critically, these are some of the most profound
manifestations of gender. I will first focus on abolition of the delegative aspect of gender
focusing on the establishment of parental roles and the promotion of women’s
physicality. I will then shift to abolition of the linkage of biological sex assigned at birth
and gender, focusing on transgender and intersex people and the issue of gendered
bathrooms.

DEGENDERING THE FAMILY

Looking first at the abolition of the delegative aspect of gender, I begin my
analysis by focusing on the category of mother and father in contrast to genderless
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parental roles. As I have made clear in the preceding chapters, the structure of the
traditionally gendered family carries rigid, well-defined, yet unquestioned, duties,
expectations, and privileges. In the family, perhaps more so than in any other institution,
gender roles are legitimized as a natural extension of the biological order, given the
reproductive capabilities of women. I choose to start here because the assumed division
of labor in the family that delegates greater domestic responsibility to women is
foundational to the broader construction of gender within patriarchy, thus affecting
virtually all women. In this way, the abolition of gendered parental roles would
necessarily lead to fundamental changes in how our society conceives of what it means to
be a man or woman more generally. In very much the same vein, many philosophers have
held that the family as an institution is responsible for the moral development of children
(Okin 95-97). Thus, within the traditionally gendered family young boys are learning to
inhabit a dominant social position while young girls are taught that their subordination is
natural. If you accept my argument to this point that gender is an injustice that stands in
the way of human advancement, then it is evident that the traditionally gendered family is
failing in one of its primary aims - the moral development of future generations. For this
reason, focusing on gender abolition within the household is a logical starting point that
will have profound effects on how gender manifests itself for future generations.
What would degendering the family look like? In her dissertation Recognizing
Social Subjects: Gender, Disability and Social Standing, Filipa Melo Lopes states that
“degendering foregrounds some of these other forms of social identification as alternative
bases for social coordination (Melo Lopes 153-154).” While my conception of gender
abolition offered in chapter two is different than Melo Lopes’, this statement is central to
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my understanding of what degendering the family would entail. The concepts of
“mother” and “father” mean much more than female parent and male parent within the
traditionally gendered family. Instead, these categories delineate different normative
conceptions of the proper distribution of labor and decision-making power within the
family. For example, within the traditionally gendered family, the mother is expected to
do a greater share of domestic labor while the father is assumed to be engaged in wage
labor outside of the household as the primary breadwinner. Of course, there are plenty of
cases where the family is not structured this way, just as there are gender-nonconforming
individuals, but the point is that when the general public speaks of motherhood and
fatherhood they have two separate but unequal concepts in mind.
With this background, we see that under Melo Lopes’ framework degendering the
family involves the dissolution of the concepts of mother and father and instead requires
the ‘foregrounding’ of parental responsibility. In accordance with Melo Lopes’
framework, social coordination around parenthood seeks to find commonality in social
position rather than distinction, thereby reducing our reliance on gender (Melo Lopes
154). Coordination around this concept would likely eschew differential responsibilities
in child-rearing duties for a more even distribution of domestic labor. In this scenario,
which parent is caring for the children at a particular moment would have more to do
with their different availability both temporally and emotionally, as opposed to a
normative notion of duty based on the parents’ biological sex. Moreover, as I have
mentioned in previous chapters, implicit in gender is the notion of hierarchy, which is
particularly pronounced within the family. Here, the necessity of substituting parenthood
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for mother/fatherhood again aligns with Melo Lopes’ conception of gender reinvention as
replacing hierarchal concepts with more egalitarian ones (Melo Lopes 155).
However, as Melo Lopes points out, this task is much easier said than done
considering the fact that gender’s often unquestioned legitimacy limits our ability to
conceive of modes of social organization outside of the notion of gender (Melo Lopes
155). In other words, Melo Lopes holds that “anything that looks like a gendered mode of
social relations to us is going to encode hierarchy in some way or another (Melo Lopes
154).” Despite the difficulty, this is a strong argument for the abolition of gender within
the family. Even if what it means to be a mother in the 21st century is different than even
50 years ago, this does not change the fact that motherhood still subordinates women
within the traditionally gendered family. Therefore, if we value egalitarianism and resent
hierarchy then the furthest advance of this end must be the abolition of gender. In order to
create a more just familial structure, the concepts of mother and father must be abolished
in favor of a parenthood that makes no distinction between men and women.
What are some of the concrete steps a well intentioned couple could take to
degender their relationship within the traditionally gendered family? At the most basic
level, couples can try to model justice within the family for their kids by equally sharing
in domestic responsibilities. Critically, the couple should also seek to make sure that
there is not just an even distribution with regards to time, but that their responsibilities are
not gendered. For example, from an abolitionist point of view it would be preferable for
young children to see their mothers doing her fair share of traditionally masculine jobs
like repairing the house, while the dad is also able to do more feminine jobs like cleaning.
Additionally, it is crucial that the couple also share equally in decision making power
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within the household. One main assumption of the traditionally gendered family is that
the father holds the most power. In other words, the traditionally gendered family is
patriarchal, so couples seeking to degender their household should be sure to challenge
this norm.
However, it is worth pointing out that gender’s force would likely endure even
with a well-intentioned couple attempting to degender their familial relations. Beyond the
imaginative limitations mentioned above, the couple would likely still be limited by their
social circumstances. What I mean by this is even if the couple degenders their
relationship as much as possible, we still live in a gendered world. With regards to child
rearing, this difficulty is evidenced in the gendered structure of the workplace. To this
day, many workplaces assume that each, presumably male, worker has a wife back home
to take care of children. This allows the male worker to have children while
simultaneously working hours that would not otherwise allow for them to be adequately
cared for. Additionally, women’s professional commitment is often underestimated due
to the gendered assumption that women will be less dedicated to their paid jobs, because
of familial and caregiving responsibilities. With this in mind, it is clear that even if both
parents intend on degendering their relationship, they are still constrained by the external
world that assumes a gendered division of labor within the family. Importantly, this
limitation will be felt more acutely by poor families that cannot pay for childcare while
both parents work and families that have less job flexibility.
In recognition of this fact, it is undeniable that governmental institutions have a
major role to play in the abolition of gender. While Rawls may leave the family outside
the scope of justice, and while this may fit with our intuitions of what overreach looks
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like, we are confusing the issue. In reality the family does not exist within a bubble,
instead, its form is actively shaped by institutional arrangements that exist outside of the
household. In this way, the family is already within the scope of governmental reach, but
how this happens is much less invasive then we act sometimes. If the family is already
within the scope of governmental policy, we should create the most just policies. Here,
through public policy, the government has the ability to promote greater freedom for
everyone within the family, rather than trying to police what goes on within the family.
For example, paid and enforced parental leave for both parents would help
promote justice within the family. Presently, women are penalized in professional
environments for the choice to have children in a way that men are not. The assumption
that mothers will take maternity leave while men continue working is one factor
contributing to the gender pay gap, and presents a major obstacle to women’s hiring and
advancement within companies. This reality further legitimizes the patriarchal ordering
of the traditionally gendered family by legitimizing the patriarchs domination through
greater economic power. If men were forced to take paternity leave, there would be an
immediate shift towards generalized parental roles as both parents would be present for
the intense child rearing responsibilities associated with infants. Additionally, this would
likely change power dynamics within the family by promoting women’s economic power
over time. Another closely related policy would be accessible child care. As with
enforced parental leave, accessible childcare would degender the family by making it
easier for women to pursue their professional as well as personal interests and goals.
Given that the imposition of domestic labor upon women is one of the main
characteristics of gender, accessible child care would fundamentally alter our current
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construction of gender. All of these policies located outside of the household have the
ability to create a more just familial structure through abolitionist steps towards
degendering.

DEGENDERING MOTION

To examine another aspect of gender where difference between men and women
is assumed to be natural, consider physical activity. As Iris Marion Young describes in
Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and
Spatiality, refusing to acknowledge the differences between how men and women move
and occupy space amounts to pretending to be blind to gender (Young 29). As Young
argues, this difference that is often assumed to be biological and essential is instead a
consequence of the enforcement of gender on all children (Young 30, 42). Of course,
Young is careful to acknowledge that this observation is both a generalization with many
outliers, and specific to our contemporary social context (Young 29). Yet, Young holds
that this contextually situated generalization reveals a great deal about the nature of
gender itself (Young 30).
I am sure that we have all heard the phrase “throw/punch/run like a girl.” While
this statement is often used to degenerate the subject, Young holds that the difference
between men’s and women’s movement is observable in many cases (Young 28). Most
generally, Young says that typically women and girls tend to not use the full range of
motion of their body during physical activity (Young 32). Women and girls are also less
likely to make full use of the space surrounding them, and thus exist within a more
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constricted space (Young 32). These two observations are not limited to actions like
throwing but are also noticeable in how women and girls walk, stand, sit and carry their
belongings (Young 32). Moreover, women and girls are often more hesitant than men to
use the full power of their body when faced with tasks that require physical exertion
(Young 33). To give an example offered by Young, when lifting a heavy box women
tend to not fully utilize their legs and instead rely on their arms too much (Young 33).
Overall, Young holds women physically interact with the surrounding environment
“timidity, uncertainty, and hesitance” rooted in a lack of belief in the capability of their
bodies (Young 34). This then leads to “feelings of incapacity, frustration, and selfconsciousness (Young 34).”
While typically this variation between men and women has been interpreted as
biological, Young posits that a better explanation centers the way in which women are
“conditioned by their sexist oppression in contemporary society (Young 34).” Examining
this quote, I must point out that the social conditioning of women in an oppressive
manner could be offered as a succinct definition of the patriarchal construction of gender,
despite the fact that Young never once uses the word gender in her essay. To tie this
statement back to my definition of gender, “conditioning” reflects the learned and
enforced aspect of gender, while “sexist oppression” exhibits the hierarchical component
of my framework. Moreover, the phrase “in contemporary society” embodies the
constructed, and context-dependent nature of gender. In other words, Young’s main
thesis could be reformulated to state that the physical differences in men’s and women’s
movement are a result of gender rather than biological sex. A strong piece of evidence in
support of this conclusion is the fact that the gap between men and women with regards
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to “motor skills, movement [and] spatial perception” is a byproduct of age (Young 44).
Until elementary school, boys and girls are indistinguishable in this respect, with the gap
widening until adulthood (Young 44). This suggests that this difference is learned as
children grow older, as we would expect if gender was the cause rather than biology.
Young argues that gender “physically handicaps” women by delegating and
enforcing a social position in which they are “physically inhibited, confined, positioned,
and objectified (Young 42-43).” Partially, this is a result of the fact that young girls are
not encouraged to develop these capacities in the same way boys are (Young 43). Instead,
women are taught to be fearfully cautious to avoid injury and maintain their femininity
(Young 44). Simultaneously, Young contends that women’s existence within a culture of
objectification also effects body movement and posture in a unique way. Specifically, one
explanation for women’s relatively closed, confined posture and movement is that more
“outwarddirectedness” would be to “invite objectification (Young 44).” Beyond the
degradation inherent in objectification, this also represents a very tangible safety concern
given the prevalence of sexual violence perpetrated by men against women (Young 44).
Why are the gendered differences in movement and spatial positioning
significant? I hold that these differences between men and women are linked to deeper
and more pernicious characteristics of gender. For example, gender teaches women to
doubt their physical capabilities (Young 34). Because the cultivation of these capacities is
not encouraged, women internalize a notion of their fragility that leads to decreased
confidence and greater timidity (Young 34). Critically, the notion that women are more
fragile than men has served to legitimize current gender roles in a significant way. A
major component of the patriarchal conception of gender is the idea of the man as the

132

protector of the woman. One need look no further than any fairy tale that centers on a
knight coming to the rescue of a woman in distress to see the cultural significance that
this gendered trope holds. Indeed, we are fed this social script again and again through
television, film Implicit here is the notion that women are in need of protection and are
incapable of fending for themselves. This is then used to justify the control of women by
men. With this in mind, it is clear that the way women are conditioned to think about
their movement and physical capabilities serves to further their own oppression by
legitimizing a form of gender that disguises oppressive control as beneficent protection.
This dynamic is seen clearly in Young’s example centering on the responses of
young boys and girls questioned about risks (Young 43). Both genders believed that
“girls are more likely to get hurt than boys are, and that girls ought to remain close to
home, while boys can roam and explore (Young 43-44).” These statements are
particularly shocking given the way in which it parallels more complex adult
relationships, despite the fact that the respondents are only children. It is not hard to see
how “ought to remain close to home,” could be rearticulated 15 years down the line as
“forego professional opportunities in favor of raising a child” or “should not be overly
ambitious” or any other deeply gendered statement. Here, we see that notions of
differential physical capability can be quickly translated into much deeper prescriptive
norms that ultimately reinforce gender.
With this in mind, we see that the difference in movement between men and
women conditioned by gender is linked to concepts such as confidence, self image and
perceived social positionality. In this way, there exists a feedback loop whereby women
are conditioned by gender to doubt their physical abilities, which then reinforce gender.
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Young also embraces a more expansive view of the implications of these observations of
gendered physical movement and spatial relation stating, “I have an intuition that the
general lack of confidence that [women] frequently have about our cognitive or
leadership abilities is traceable in part to an original doubt of our body’s capacity (Young
45).” Though she is cautious to make definite claims given that there is a lack of
empirical evidence as this topic is relatively understudied.
What is the relevance of this example in the context of gender abolition? If gender
and attached concepts like self image are really linked to movement in a reciprocally
causal way, then our analysis thus far has revealed a very concrete avenue towards the
abolition of gender. Though it may seem mundane in comparison to the term abolition
intself, one significant way of dismantling gender is by challenging the gendered
difference in movement. Empowering women physically has the consequence of
undermining the notion that women are fragile or helpless. As I just mentioned, this
notion is intimately linked to one prominent legitimizing myth of gender that women
need to be protected and therefore controlled by men. This myth is directly tied to the
subjugation of women insofar as the hierarchical structure of gender is a byproduct of this
assumed “biological” difference. In this way, overcoming the gendered difference in
movement is an act of abolition. The empowerment of women physically necessarily
weakens the legitimizing myth of women’s helplessness, and therefore erodes the force
of gender itself in a not insignificant way.
What does this look like in practice? To offer some thoughts on raising a
daughter, it is important that parents pay attention to the gendered dimensions of how
their children play. While parents should certainly always have the health of their child at
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the forefront of their mind, parents must also critically examine whether or not they are
encouraging their daughter to be careful in a distinct way from their son. As Young
describes, this creates within children a gendered idea that women should take fewer risks
and remain closer to home than boys who should be afforded greater freedom. Moreover,
parents should avoid giving heavily gendered toys. While boys and girls alike may love
stuffed animals and dolls, it is important that young girls also be given the opportunities
for athletic achievement that are often forced upon young boys. Athleticism for boys is
held as a virtue in a way that it is not for girls thus laying the groundwork for the
gendered difference in movement described by Young. By encouraging children to play
in a less gendered way, we enable kids to grow in a way that is less subject to gender.
From the perspective of a benign planner, it is apparent that a crucial component
of gender abolition should be to encourage women to express their power physically.
This could take the form of investing in and promoting women’s sports. Critically, in
order to be most effective this must occur from an early age, so that young girls are able
to reap the benefits to confidence and self esteem that come with increased belief in
bodily power. However, this is not to minimize the importance of professional athletics
for women. Because women’s sports are so undervalued relative to men’s from both a
monetary and social standpoint, there is less incentive for young girls to competitively
participate in athletics relative to young boys. Here, I must point out that men’s
willingness to make jokes to demean women’s sports is quite pernicious. These jokes
serve to reinforce patriarchy by instilling a sense of physical inferiority in women, and
reinforce gender by relying on essentialist notions of men and women’s differential
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capabilities. With this in mind, it is crucial that abolitionists vocally identify these types
of digs as the misogyny that they are.
While advocates for equity between women and men’s sports may not realize it,
by enabling women to develop their physical power they are actively engaged in the
process of deconstructing gender. First of all, women’s sports directly undermines the
gendered notion that women are physically fragile. As I mentioned above, this
legitimizing myth of fragility is intimately connected with gender hierarchy.
Additionally, physical differences between men and women’s movement is often pointed
to as evidence of the essentialist differences between men and women. In this way,
working to undermine the social basis for the gendered difference in movement would
over time weaken the broader notion that men and women’s differential position within
society is a natural consequence of our biologies. Clearly, one fruitful yet simple path
towards gender abolition is to promote women’s physicality through sport.

ABOLITION OF THE LINKAGE ASPECT

As I mentioned in my chapter on gender abolition, transgender people’s very
existence challenges the restrictive construction of gender that exists under patriarchy. As
I have stated, my definition of gender is an operative definition rather than a normative
one. In other words, the fact that transgender people are marginalized by this definition,
in the sense that their gender identity is seperate from their biological sex assigned at
birth which is a constitutive element of gender, is a reflection of the very real alienation
that transgender people experience within patriarchal society. By choosing their gender
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identity, rather than accepting the assignment based on linkage as cisgender people do,
transgender people push against the boundaries of gender in a meaningful way and are
exposed to severe violence as a consequence.
In this way, all transgender people are engaged in a revolutionary, abolitionist act
that fundamentally challenges the dominant gender ideology. Through living their truth,
transgender people pave the road for those in the future who wish to rebel against the
injustice that is gender. Critically, the beneficiaries of transgender individual’s
trailblazing are not only other transgender individuals. Virtually all humans would benefit
from the erosion of the linkage between biological sex and gender. If this linkage and
subsequent involuntary assignment at birth is abolished, then people would be truly free
to choose to live in whatever way they see fit for themselves.
Surely, social roles would persist, but by detaching these roles from an unchosen
characteristic like sex humans would begin to be able to enter into these roles
consensually without coercion. This would certainly result in a radical change to
whatever remaining gender roles that there would be. Because gender today is coercive, it
is possible to maintain a deeply oppressive hierarchical system. However, if people were
able to freely choose their gender role then it is likely that over time the category of
“woman” would be characterized by subjugation to a lesser extent, as people would
theoretically reject an unequivocally harmful social role. Even if the resulting social roles
did have some component of dominant vs submissive behavior, this would no longer
constitute a hierarchy in any recognizable way as the roles would be both consensual and
fluid.
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With this in mind, it is apparent that one of the most direct ways to promote the
abolition of gender is through the promotion of transgender people’s rights. Clearly, the
plight of transgender people is intimately connected to that of those who suffer any form
of gender oppression. In recognition of this deep connection, gender abolitionists should
seek to increase the visibility and social acceptance of transgender people. While this
certainly requires greater media exposure and education for the general population,
gender abolitionists may find their interest are best served by directing their attention to
parents. In recognition of the millions of transgender individuals whose gender identity
does not align with their sex assigned at birth, abolitionists should advocate that parents
should avoid gendering their child at birth. Clearly, this process of gendering is often
wrong; a mistake that imposes significant costs on the child through their development. If
parents ceased to gender their kids in such a rigid way, then the process of transitioning
would likely be far less tumultuous as transitioning individuals would be making a much
less radical change. This increasingly genderless world would also likely result in a
decrease in violence against transgender indviduals.
This example is extremely interesting as it exemplifes the reciprocal nature of
transgender liberation and gender liberation generally. It is as if there is a feedback loop,
whereby degendering in a general way advances the wellbeing of transgender individuals,
while at the very same time actions that uplift transgender people also promote
degendering. For example, on the surface, the practice of displaying personal pronouns, a
key component of transgender inclusivity, may seem to reinforce gender. However, in
reality displaying pronouns is an act that is undertaken in recognition of the idea that
individuals should be free to choose their gender identity. Clearly, this is a direct
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challenge to the linkage of biological sex and gender. As the two previous examples
show, transgender liberation and full gender abolition are inseperably connected.
Another method for weakening the linkage of biological sex and gender is
through the creation of social conditions and institutions that do not force people to police
the boundaries of gender. For example, in her dissertation Filipa Melo Lopes argues that
one important site of gender contestation is bathrooms (Melo Lopes 157). Melo Lopes
argues that instead of attempting to fix the inherent logical tension at the heart of gender
and equality, we should instead attempt to create a less gendered world (Melo Lopes
157). In the context of gendered restrooms, Melo Lopes argues that “when a security
guard, or even another user, finds themselves in the position to police segregation, they
have to think quite consciously about what men and women are like (Melo Lopes 157).”
In this way, the gendered design of restrooms strengthens the social enforcement
mechanism linking biological sex and gender by bringing to the forefront the question of
who fits within the categories of man and woman.
By placing individuals into positions to police the boundaries of gender, people
are encouraged to make judgement calls about others’ sex regardless of their gender
presentation, and more explicitly their inborn genetalia. Melo Lopes argues that one
common but flawed approach to the issue of gendered bathrooms is “to educate and train
employees and bathroom users about the nuances of masculinity, femininity, the need to
respect transgender people, or masculine women (Melo Lopes 158).” However, this
approach is still problematic in that it still relies on individuals’ enforcement of gender
boundaries merely in a more benign way. These types of reforms continue to legitimize
gender in a way that naturalizes an inherently unjust social construction. Just because
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restrooms may be policed in a more inclusive manner does not change the fact that
bathrooms will continue to act as a site that links gender and exclusivity in the minds of
every participant. With this in mind, Melo Lopes suggests that a superior approach would
be to degender bathrooms in a way such that no one is put into a position to monitor the
actions of others (Melo Lopes 158). This type of reimagining would have the effect of
removing the “centrality of gender to certain social contexts (Melo Lopes 158).” In Melo
Lopes’ word, this is an example of “degendering,” or alternatively abolition.

CONCLUSION

As I have argued, there are two primary ways to approach gender abolition through deconstructing the delegative aspect of gender or by eroding gender’s linkage
with biological sex. First, I examined the abolition of the delegative aspect of gender,
offering two examples of features of gender that are thought to be most natural. Looking
first at the gendered social categories of motherhood and fatherhood, I held that abolition
in this context would require eschewing these two social roles for the gender neutral
concept of parenthood. Critically, while I offered some suggestions for parents seeking to
degender their family dynamics, I also highlighted the central role that governments’
have in facilitating gender abolition in this context. While many philosophers have held
that the family is beyond the scope of justice, my analysis suggests that in order to create
a world with gender justice, it is necessary that the government attend to the institutional
consequences of the patriarchal construction of gender. In this way, policies such as
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enforced paternity leave and accessible child care are central to the broader mission of
gender abolition.
I also put forward the gendered differences in movement as an example of gender
that is often taken to be natural. However, I demonstrated that this phenomenon is a
byproduct of the patriarchal construction of gender that serves to legitimize male
domination. In this way, the perception of physical difference in men and women creates
a feedback loop that deepens this differential and then uses this to legitimize the unjust
delegation of social goods such as self determination and power. With this background, I
hold that one seemingly mundane but profound path towards weakening the delegative
aspect of gender is to encourage women’s motility in the same way as is the case with
men. Therefore, promoting women’s physicality is an important avenue towards gender
abolition.
Additionally, gender abolition can occur through the weakening of the linkage
between biological sex and gender. As I have discussed in previous chapters, perhaps the
most visible example of this process of abolition in this context is the brave,
revolutionary action of trangender people who eschew their assigned gender in favor of
self determination. Here, the brutal force of gender is readily apparent in the amount of
violence faced by transgender individuals for their deviation from what is socially
acceptable. In this way, the struggles of gender abolitionists and transgender individuals
are inextricably linked with each groups activism overlapping and serving the same ends.
With this in mind, it is apparent that gender abolitionists should focus on promoting
transgender peoples rights. I also put forward the idea that gender abolition requires the
creation of a world that does not police the boundaries of gender through, for example,
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the existence of transgender restrooms. These both represent important ways that gender
abolitionists can seek to undermine the linkage of biological sex and unchosen social
roles inherent in gender.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

To briefly take stock of my overall argument put forward in this thesis, I began
by offering an operational definition of gender. My definition, which focused on gender
as the basis for the distribution of social expectations and it’s linkage with biological sex,
was intended to reflect gender’s restrictive and hierarchical nature. I then clarified
precisely what I meant by abolition. In short, my view of abolition is the full realization
of genderlessness. We move towards genderlessness through abolitionist acts that weaken
either the delegative aspect of gender or the force of gender’s connection with biological
sex.
I then put forward two contrasting theories of human advancement and showed
that both imply gender abolition. First, I looked at Marx’s ideas regarding human
emancipation and the abolition of the division of labor broadly. Human emancipation
requires the dissolution of social constructs that create antagonisms between humans that
prevent our flourishing. I argued that gender is exactly this type of social construct, and
thus human emancipation requires the dissolution of gender. Similarly, Marx calls for the
abolition of the division of labor, so given that gender has been constructed upon the
division of labor here we again see that gender abolition is implied. In contrast to the
Marxist perspective explored in chapter three, chapter four focused on Amartya Sen’s
Development as Freedom. Sen’s vision of human development mandates for the removal
of sources of unfreedom, and as I established in this chapter gender is certainly one of the
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most profound sources of unfreedom that we often leave unchallenged. With this in mind,
Sen’s vision of human development taken to the furthest extent would necessarily have
an element of gender abolition.
In chapter five, I transitioned slightly arguing that gender not only harms women,
but also men. Drawing upon Briana Toole’s work on standpoint epistemology, I posited
that from an epistemic perspective gender constitutes a harm for men. Gender hinders
men’s ability to accurately understand themselves, the world, and their position within it.
Critically, these epistemic harms also lead to negative physiological and emotional
outcomes such as high rates of mortality from heart disease driven by the stress of their
unchosen social roles. Additionally, I draw upon the work of Robin Dembroff who
argues that gender oppression is more complex than a binary view that asserts that all
men benefit from patriarchy. Instead, they argue that patriarchy is built around the
exclusive notion of the category of “real men.” In this way, men that are excluded from
this category, for example black men or gay men, can face gender based violence by
virtue of their maleness. These two arguments are intended to show that gender abolition
will not only benefit women. Instead, gender abolition will improve the condition of all
human beings.
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